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INTRODUCTION

The two justifications most prominently offered, both in the
academic literature and the legislative arena, for vesting responsibility for environmental regulation at the federal level focus on the
existence of a "race to the bottom" and of interstate externalities.'

I For discussion of other rationales for federal regulation, see Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalismin MandatingState Implementation of National
EnvironmentalPolity, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-15 (1977). For a more recent treatment
of these issues, generally consistent with StewLrt's categorization, see John P. Dwyer,
The Practiceof Federalism Under the Clean AirAct, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1219-24 (1995).
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The "race-to-the-bottom" rationale for federal environmental
regulation posits that states, in an effort to induce geographically
mobile firms to locate within their jurisdictions, will offer them
suboptimally lax environmental standards so as to benefit from
additional jobs and tax revenues.
The problem of interstate
externalities arises because a state that sends pollution to another
state obtains the labor and fiscal benefits of the economic activity
that generates the pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the
activity. Under these conditions, economic theory maintains that an
undesirably large amount of pollution will cross state lines.
Though they are sometimes conflated, the race to the bottom
and the problem of interstate externalities are analytically distinct.
The concern over interstate externalities can be addressed by
limiting the amount of pollution that can cross interstate borders,
thereby "showing" upwind states the costs that they impose on
downwind states. As long as the externality is eliminated, it would
not matter, from the perspective of controlling interstate externalities, that the upwind state chooses to have poor environmental
quality-a central concern of race-to-the-bottom advocates. Conversely, one could imagine a situation in which the upwind state has
chosen a high level of environmental quality but has encouraged the
sources in the state to have tall stacks and to locate near the
interstate border, so that their effects will be felt only in the
downwind state. In that case, race-to-the-bottom advocates would
have no concern, but there is an externality problem.'
A few years ago, I challenged the accepted wisdom on the "race
to the bottom," arguing that, contrary to the prevailing consensus,
competition among states for industry should not be expected to lead
See infra text accompanying notes 35-41.

These two rationales also are distinct from the public choice argument for vesting
responsibility for environmental regulation at the federal level, with which they are
also sometimes confused. Such public choice arguments rest on the claims that state
political processes undervalue the benefits of environmental regulation or overvalue
the corresponding costs relative to the federal process, and that the outcome from the
federal process is socially more desirable. Even if there were no interstate
externalities, or if industry were wholly immobile so that there could be no race to the
bottom, environmental standards would still be more protective at the federal level
if, as the public choice argument posits, environmental groups are more effective at
this level. Conversely, the interstate externality and race-to-the-bottom arguments for
federal environmental regulation may apply even if states properly value the benefits
of environmental protection. For further discussion of the distinctions among these
different rationales for federal regulation, see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
InterstateCompetition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"RationaleforFederal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1221-24 (1992).
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to a race that decreases social welfare.' Moreover, I showed that
even if there were such a race, federal environmental regulation
would shift the competition among states to other regulatory arenas,
or to the fiscal arena. Federal environmental regulation would then
have undesirable effects on state interests in these arenas, and would
not enhance social welfare. Race-to-the-bottom arguments in favor
of federal environmental regulation are, in essence, a frontal
challenge on federalism because the problems that they seek to
correct can be addressed only by exclusive federal regulatory and
fiscal powers.4
This Article, in turn, criticizes the various approaches that federal
environmental laws have taken to address the problem of interstate
externalities. Part I shows that the Clean Air Act-the statute
designed to deal with the pollution that gives rise to the most serious
problems of interstate externalities-has been unsuccessful at forcing
the internalization of interstate externalities. Its core provisions
cannot be justified by the need to control interstate externalities, and
may have exacerbated the problem. Similarly, the relatively minor
provisions directed at controlling interstate externalities have been
wholly ineffective, largely as a result of the failure of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the federal courts to define
a coherent and logical body of law. In fact, despite congressional
preoccupation with the problem and the existence of statutory
provisions expressly designed to correct it, the downwind states have
always been unsuccessful at constraining upwind pollution.5 A
similar situation arises under the Clean Water Act.
Part II examines how to design a desirable approach to controlling interstate externalities. 6 The inquiry reveals the extent to which
I See Revesz, supra note 2, at 1211-12. For commentary generally supportive of my
approach, see, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 42-43, 81-83 (1995);
James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a FederalSystemand Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1236-37 (1995); Richard B. Stewart,
Environmental Regulation and InternationalCompetitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2058-59
(1993); Richard B. Stewart, InternationalTrade and Environment: Lessonsfrom the Federal
Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1371 (1992) [hereinafter Stewart,
International]; Stephen Williams, Culpability, Restitution, and the Environment: The
Vitality of Common Law Rules, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 559, 560-61 (1994).
4 See Revesz, supra note 2, at 1244-47.
1 For expositional convenience, this discussion focuses on air pollution. Except
where otherwise indicated, see infra notes 7, 124, the arguments also apply in the
context of water pollution.
6 This Article focuses on pollution externalities. It does not explicitly deal with
situations in which the interstate externality arises as a result of existence (non-use)
values placed on natural resources by out-of-state citizens. Such existence values
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the EPA and the courts have overlooked factors that are relevant to
this task. For example, the current regime inquires only whether the
emissions of a proposed source in an upwind state are excessive. But
to achieve a socially desirable level of interstate spillovers, the regime
should also determine whether the proposed stack height and
location are motivated by an effort to externalize the effects of
pollution.7 Also, the current regime conducts this inquiry only when
there is a violation of a federal ambient standard in the downwind
state. But in order to properly allocate the downwind state's margin
for growth, or to protect the legitimate interests of downwind states
in enforcing more stringent state ambient standards, one must also
assess the permissibility of upwind pollution when there is no
violation of federal standards.
Similarly, the current regime
considers the problem statically, at one point in time. Instead, the
system should undertake a dynamic analysis, which examines
desirable allocations of the pollution-control burden between upwind
and downwind sources in light of economic growth.
Part III shows how the Dormant Commerce Clause supports
stronger controls on interstate pollution externalities. This clause
defines an understanding of federalism that ought to inform as a
matter of policy, though not of constitutional law, federal regulatory
schemes designed to address the problem of interstate externalities.
Attention to the principles embodied in the Dormant Commerce
Clause would lead to constraints on interstate externalities well
beyond those currently enforced under the federal statutes.
Finally, Part IV presents a scheme in which marketable permits
would be traded in units of environmental degradation (as opposed
to the more traditional market-based schemes that trade units of
emissions). In this proposed market, both upwind and downwind
sources would purchase permits to degrade ambient air-quality levels
in the downwind state. The amount of emissions allowed by each
permit would depend on the impact that emissions at each source
have on ambient air-quality levels at the affected location, which is a
function of factors such as the location of the source, the height of
the stack, and the strength of prevailing winds. Using marketablepermit schemes to address the problem of interstate externalities
solves an important problem of how to coordinate several states'
plans for economic growth. Such coordination would be difficult to
provide a powerfuljustification for federal control over exceptional natural resources
such as national parks. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215-16 & n.77.
7 In the case of water pollution, there is no direct analog to stack height.
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accomplish through non-market-based federal intervention. This
argument for marketable-permit schemes is independent from and
in addition to the standard claim that such schemes lead to the
minimization of the costs of achieving a given environmental
objective.
The central purpose of this Article, particularly in light of my
prior work,8 is to refocus the attention of federal environmental
regulation. Of the two most prominent reasons for vesting responsibility for environmental regulation at the federal level, the race-tothe-bottom rationale is analytically unsound, despite the fact that
much of the legal regime is structured to redress this asserted evil.9
In contrast, the rationale for federal regulation premised on the
problem of interstate externalities is analytically unimpeachable but
has not been effectively redressed in the current pollution- control
scheme. ° At a time when federal environmental regulation is
under fierce political attack, 1 it is critical to define clearly what
tasks can best be accomplished at the federal level and to ensure that
the resulting regulatory scheme in fact accomplishes those tasks.
This Article shows why a great deal more attention needs to be paid
to fashioning an effective federal response to the problem of
interstate externalities.
I. INTERSTATE EXTERNALITIES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT

This Part reviews and critiques the treatment of interstate
externalities under the Clean Air Act. Section A discusses the major
provisions of the statute. Section B shows that these provisions are
not well suited to control interstate externalities, and argues that the
regulatory scheme adopted in 1970 may in fact have exacerbated the
problem. This section also shows that the Act's tall-stack and acidrain provisions provide, at best, limited relief. Section C evaluates
s See Revesz, supra note 2.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
10 See infra Part I.C.
I' For example, a recent report commissioned by the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees calls for Congress and the EPA to give states, communities
and businesses greater flexibility and autonomy in addressing environmental
problems, forging a "new partnership ... based on 'accountable devolution' of
national programs and on a reduction in EPA oversight when it is not needed."
National Academy of PublicAdministration Summary Report to Congress on Role, Structure of
the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency ReleasedApril 12, 1995 (Text), Daily Env't Rep. (BNA)
(Apr. 13, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAED File.
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sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 126(b)-the two provisions specifically
12
designed to constrain interstate externalities.
A. Overview of the Clean Air Act

Some background on the central provisions of the Clean Air Act
is necessary to evaluate the Act's treatment of interstate spillovers.
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"), set at the
federal level by the EPA, are the statute's centerpiece. The NAAQS
prescribe nationally uniform maximum concentrations for pollutants
"which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."" These ambient standards establish the minimum levels
of environmental quality that the EPA will tolerate. They do not
directly constrain the activities of any polluter. Instead, the
pollution-control burden necessary to meet the ambient standards is
allocated to the various sources by means of emissions standards:
new source performance standards ("NSPS") for new stationary
sources14 and standards for moving sources-principally automobiles-set by the EPA, 5 and standards for existing sources set by
the states through State Implementation Plans ("SIPs")"6
The original structure of the statute, which dates back to 1970,
left two important questions unanswered. First, what are the
requirements of regions that have air quality that is better than the
NAAQS? Second, what consequences attach to the failure to meet
the NAAQS?
To address the first question, the 1977 amendments adopted a
complex Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") program,
which contains both an ambient air-quality component and an
emissions component. 17 The emissions-standard component of the
PSD program consists of a requirement that major sources in PSD
areas comply with a limitation set by reference to the best available
control technology ("BACT"). BACT standards must be at least as
stringent as any applicable NSPS standard.'"
12 The approach

to interstate externalities in the domain of water pollution, where
interstate externalities also are potentially an important issue, is presented in the
margin. See infra notes 38, 74, 105, 124.
Clean Air Act § 108, 42
See Clean Air Act § 111,
15 See Clean Air Act § 202,
16 See Clean Air Act § 110,
's

'4

17

U.S.C. § 7408 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).

See Clean Air Act §§ 160-69, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-79 (1994).

18See Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1994).
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The ambient air-quality component is more complicated. Areas
with better ambient air-quality levels than the NAAQS are subjected
to more stringent ambient standards. For sulfur dioxide and
particulates, ambient air-quality levels in these areas cannot exceed
a baseline plus an increment. 9 The baseline is the ambient
concentration at the time that the first "major emitting facility,"
defined as a source emitting more than a prescribed amount of
pollution, applies for a permit.2" The increment of allowable
degradation beyond the baseline depends upon the classification of
the area. In Class I areas, which primarily consist of national parks,
the allowable increment is only about 2% of the level of the NAAQS.
In Class II areas, which initially contained all other areas covered by
the PSD program, an increment of 25% of the level of the NAAQS
is allowed. Subject to various procedural safeguards, the states have
authority to reclassify particular areas to Class III, where the
increment can reach 50% of the level of the NAAQS. 2 ' In no event
may the ambient air-quality levels in PSD areas (the baseline plus the
increment) exceed the NAAQS.22
Under the PSD program, degradation that takes place before the
23
establishment of a baseline is not counted against the increment.
For example, under the NAAQS, ambient air-quality levels of sulfur
dioxide, averaged over a year, cannot exceed 80p g/m3.2 4

The

2
corresponding PSD increment for Class II areas is 201ig/m. 1
Consider a Class II area that, at the time of the 1977 amendments,
had an ambient air-quality level of 40p1g/m3, which deteriorated by
101pg/m' as a result of pollution from sources that were not "major
emitting facilit[ies]," from in-state sources outside the PSD area, or
from out-of-state sources, before the baseline was set. This Class II
area could still avail itself of the full increment of 201ig/m 3 . In
contrast, if the area's ambient air-quality levels in 1977 had been
60pg/m', the deterioration of 10Lg/m prior to the establishment of
the baseline would have left room for further deterioration of only
10pg/m' because at that point the NAAQS of 80[Lg/m 3 would
become constraining.

1'See Clean Air Act § 163, 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (1994).

Clean Air Act § 169(1), (4), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1), (4) (1994).
See Clean Air Act §§ 162-63, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472-73 (1994).
22 See Clean Air Act § 163(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7473(4) (1994).
1' See Clean Air Act § 169(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(4) (1994).
24 See 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1995).
20

21

1 See Clean Air Act § 163(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b) (2) (1994).
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For areas with air quality worse than the NAAQS, the 1977
amendments established a nonattainment program. 26 These areas
were required to make "reasonable further progress" toward the
attainment of the NAAQS and had to attain the NAAQS by the
mid-1980s. The 1990 amendments extended this deadline, creating
distinctions based on the magnitude of the nonattainment problem.2 s
In addition to this ambient component, new sources seeking to
locate in nonattainment areas have to meet an emissions standard
defined by reference to the "lowest achievable emission rate"
("LAER"), which, like BACT, has to be at least as stringent as
NSPS.29 In addition, such sources must obtain "offsets," under
which existing sources in the area reduce their emissions by more
than the amount that will result from the new source, so that, in the
aggregate, there is "reasonable further progress" toward the
attainment of the NAAQS.3 °
Moreover, existing sources in
nonattainment areas must meet "reasonably available control
technology" ("RACT") standards."'
B. Impact of the Statute on InterstateExternalities

This section shows that the ambient and emissions standards
described above, which form the core of the Clean Air Act, are an
ineffective and poorly targeted means of dealing with the problem of
interstate externalities. It also explains why these provisions may
have exacerbated the interstate spillover problem. Then, it analyzes
three specific sets of provisions directed primarily at controlling
interstate externalities. Section 123, added in the 1977 amendments,
places constraints on a state's ability to use tall stacks as a method to
meet ambient air-quality standards, on the ground that the distance
that pollution travels increases with the height of the stack. 2 The
acid-rain provisions of the 1990 amendments3 3 create a system of
marketable permits in sulfur dioxide. Finally, sections 110(a) (2) (D)
and 126(b), also added in the 1977 amendments and amended in
21

2

1

21

See Clean Air Act §§ 171-93, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-15 (1994).
Clean Air Act §§ 171(1), 172(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(1), 7502(c) (2) (1994).
See Clean Air Act §§ 182, 187, 189, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a, 7512a, 7513a (1994).
Clean Air Act §§ 171(3), 173(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(3), 7503(a) (2) (1994).

s Clean Air Act § 173(a) (1) (A), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a) (1) (A), (c) (1994).
31 Clean Air Act § 172(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1) (1994).
12 See Clean Air Act § 123, 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1994).
"5See Clean Air Act §§ 401-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-51o (1994).
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1990, seek to place direct limits on the amount of pollution from
upwind states that is permitted to affect air quality in downwind
states. 4 This section shows that the tall-stack and acid-rain provisions provide at best a partial response to the problem. Thus,
sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b) provide the only means by which
the Clean Air Act can address the problem of interstate externalities
in a comprehensive manner. As section C later shows, however,
these provisions have been wholly ineffective.
1. Ambient and Emissions Standards
The Clean Air Act's federal emissions standards for stationary
sources-NSPS, BACT, LAER and RACT, as well as its federal
emissions standards for automobiles-are not a good means by which
to combat the problem of interstate externalities. These standards
constrain the pollution from each source, but do not regulate the
number of sources within any given state or the location of the
sources.
Similarly, the various federal ambient air-quality standards of the
Clean Air Act-the NAAQS, the baseline-plus-increment approach of
the PSD program, and the "reasonable further progress requirements" of the nonattainment provisions-also are not well-targeted
means to address the problem of interstate externalities, because they
are both overinclusive and underinclusive. From the perspective of
constraining interstate externalities at a desirable level, ambient
standards are overinclusive because they require a state to restrict
pollution that has only in-state consequences. Concern about
interstate externalities can be addressed by limiting the amount of
pollution that is permitted to cross interstate borders. Such
externalities can be controlled even if the upwind state chooses to
have poor environmental quality within its borders.
Conversely, the federal ambient air-quality standards are
underinclusive from the perspective of controlling interstate
externalities because a state could meet the applicable ambient
standards but nonetheless export a great deal of pollution to
downwind states because the sources in the state have tall stacks and
are located near the interstate border. In fact, a state might meet its
ambient standards precisely because it exports a great deal of its
pollution.
" SeeCleanAirAct§§ 110(a) (2) (D), 126(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a) (2) (D), 7426(b)
(1994).
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The federal ambient and emissions standards could perhaps be
justified as a second-best means by which to reduce the problem of
uncontrolled interstate externalities. One might believe that by
reducing pollution across the board they reduce interstate externalities proportionately. So, for example, if they lead to the halving of
the aggregate amount of pollution, one might think that they would
also cut in half the pollution that crosses state lines.
Such a view, however, is incorrect as a matter of both theory and
empirical observation. The amount of aggregate emissions is not the
only variable that affects the level of interstate externalities; two
other factors play important roles. The first is the height of the stack
from which the pollution is emitted-the higher the stack, the lesser
the impact close to the source and the greater the impact far from
the source. 5 Thus, absent a federal constraint, states have an
incentive to encourage their sources to use tall stacks as a way to
externalize both the health and environmental effects of the
pollution, as well as the regulatory costs of complying with the
federal ambient standards.
Second, the level of interstate externalities is affected by the
location of the sources. In the eastern part of the United States,
where the problem of interstate pollution is most serious, the
prevailing winds blow from west to east. Thus, states have an
incentive to induce their sources to locate close to their downwind
borders, for example, through the use of tax incentives or subsidies,
so that the bulk of the effects of the pollution is externalized.
The best evidence that states do indeed encourage sources to use
tall stacks can be found in the provisions of the SIPs adopted by at
least fifteen states in response to the enactment of the Clean Air Act
in 1970. These SIPs allowed sources to meet the NAAQS by using
taller stacks rather than by reducing emissions.3 6 In those SIPs, the
permissible level of emissions was an increasing function of the
height of the stack.37 If the stack was sufficiently high, the effects
See SAMUELJ. WILLIAMSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF AIR POLLUTION 219-25 (1973).
36

See CleanAir Act Oversight: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on EnvironmentalPollution

of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 330-31, 337, 357-59 (1974)
[hereinafter Senate Comm. on Public Works]; Richard E. Ayres, Enforcement ofAirPollution
Controls on Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q.
441, 452 & nn.28, 30 (1975).

11 For example, the Georgia regulations that were struck down in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F2d 390, 403-11 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975),
provided that, for sulfur dioxide, allowable emissions could be proportional to the
cube of the stack height for stacks under 300 feet, and proportional to the square of
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would be felt only in the downwind states and would therefore have
no impact on in-state ambient air-quality levels. Through these
measures, the states created strong incentives for their firms to
externalize the effects of their sources of pollution."
It is true that states had an incentive to externalize pollution even
before the enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970 because, by
encouraging tall stacks, states could make other states bear the
adverse health effects of pollution. The 1970 provisions, however,
created an additional incentive. By encouraging the use of tall
stacks, states could also externalize the regulatory impact of the
standards, thereby availing themselves, for example, of the opportunity to attract additional sources without violating the NAAQS.
Taller stacks entail higher costs of construction and, possibly,
operation. It is therefore conceivable that a state that did not view
the externalization of health effects as sufficient by itself to outweigh
imposing such costs on in-state firms would reach a different
conclusion when tall stacks lead to the externalization of both health
and regulatory impacts.
More generally, before 1970, the states had not developed
extensive regulatory programs for controlling air pollution. The net
benefits of taller stacks, if any, might not have been worth the
institutional investment necessary to create a regulatory program to
transmit incentives for such stacks. The Clean Air Act, by requiring
states to prepare SIPs, gave them no choice but to create an
institutional structure designed to regulate the emissions of industrial
sources. With that structure in place, it became comparatively easier
to encourage tall stacks.
In addition, the health benefits of reducing the impact of
emissions on in-state ambient air-quality levels are external to the
firm emitting the pollution. Thus, a firm will take such effects into
account only if required to do so by a regulator. In contrast, the
regulatory benefits of reducing the impact on in-state ambient air-

the stack height for stacks over 300 feet. See Georgia Rules and Regulations for Air
Quality Control § 270-5-24-.02(2) (g) (1972). A similar formula applied to particulate
emissions. See id. § 270-5-24-.02(2) (m). Thus, a sufficiently high stack would
eliminate the need for any emissions reduction.
" In a quite different manner, the Clean Water Act increased the ability of states
to externalize pollution by displacing common law remedies in interstate disputes.
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981), held that the Clean Water Act
preempted the federal common law of nuisance. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987), held that the Clean Water Act preempted state nuisance
actions brought under the common law of the affected state. Under Ouellette, actions
can be rfiaintained only under the common law of the source state. See id. at 493-94.
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quality levels can be captured directly by the firms, which, by using
taller stacks, need to invest less to reduce their emissions.3 9 While
before 1970, firms would have expended resources in tall stacks only
if required to do so by a state regulatory agency, after 1970 they had
an independent incentive for pursuing such a policy.
It is therefore not surprising that the use of tall stacks expanded
considerably after 1970. For example, whereas in 1970 only two
stacks in the United States were higher than 500 feet, by 1985 more
than 180 stacks were higher than 500 feet and twenty-three were
higher than 1000 feet.40
In contrast to the experience with tall-stack provisions, my
research has uncovered no direct evidence concerning whether states
also provided incentives for sources to locate close to their downwind
borders. There is, however, literature suggesting that such incentives
are present in the case of the siting of waste sites.4 It would not be
39 The savings can be substantial. For example, a study in the early 1970s, when
tall-stack credits were most prevalent, see infra text accompanying notes 41-42, showed
that the cost of complying with regulatory requirements was between $60/kw and
$130/kw for a new lime scrubber, as compared with between $4/kw and $10/kw for
a tall stack. See Senate Comm. on Public Works, supra note 36, at 210, 215; see also
Michael Weisskopf, 'Tall Stacks' and Acid Rain, WASH. POST, June 5, 1989, at Al, A6
(reporting that the stack of an electric utility cost $10 million in the mid-1970s and
that the alternative of outfitting it with scrubbers would cost $756 million).
IoSee Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution ControlLaw: What's Worked;
What 'sFailed;What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1598 (1991); James R. Vestigo, Acid
Rain and Tall Stack Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 ENvTL. L. 711, 730 (1985).
41 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, EnvironmentalJustice and DiscriminatorySiting: RiskBased Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 421 (1995)
("[S]tates and municipalities tend to site polluting facilities on their boundaries,
passing external costs on to other communities."); Robert B. Wiygul & Sharon C.
Harrington, EnvironmentalJustice in Rural Communities Part One: RCRA, Communities,
and EnvironmentalJustice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 405, 437-38 (1993-1994) (referring to
"state line syndrome,' in which waste disposal facilities are frequently proposed for
political subdivisions bordering another state").
Several state statutes have acknowledged and attempted to control the incentives
for municipalities and counties to encourage the development near their borders of
facilities that have undesirable consequences on the adjoining area. Minnesota, for
example, has established a regional council for metropolitan Minneapolis-St. Paul,
which serves "as informal mediator and helps municipalities negotiate side agreements
when impacts from development in one community are felt by its neighbors." Michael
Wheeler, NegotiatingNIMBYs: Learningfrom the Failureof the Massachusetts Siting Law,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 286 n.171 (1994); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473F.01-.13
(West 1977). The same issues arise with respect to environmentally fragile, "critical
areas," such as coastal zones, shorelands and wetlands, which often receive special
state protection. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1990). In these areas, 'the benefits of
development, in terms of new jobs or an expanded tax base, will be enjoyed by local
residents, while the environmental losses will be felt statewide." Id. at 65.
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implausible to believe that states acted in the same manner with
respect to air pollution facilities.
In summary, the central components of the Clean Air Act are not
an effective or well-targeted response to the problem of interstate
externalities. As I argued elsewhere, vesting authority at the federal
level to promulgate the ambient and emissions standards described
above can best be explained by reference to the race-to-the-bottom
justification-a justification that I have criticized-rather than to the
interstate externality justification.
2. Tall-Stack Provisions
While the ability of states to encourage the use of tall stacks has
been curtailed somewhat since the mid-1970s, the concerns expressed
in the preceding subsection are still salient. Tall stacks remain a
means by which excessive pollution can be externalized.
In 1974, the Fifth Circuit struck down the EPA's approval of
Georgia's SIP on the ground that the SIP relied excessively on tall
stacks as the means to meet the NAAQS. 42 This decision led the
EPA to promulgate regulations limiting the "credit" that a source
could obtain by the use of tall stacks. In 1977, Congress amended
the statute to explicitly require such a limitation. The relevant
provision states that the degree of emissions limitation required by
a SIP "shall not be affected... by so much of the stack height of any
source as exceeds good engineering practice (as determined under
regulations promulgated by the Administrator [of the EPA])."
Interestingly, however, the statute also provides that "[i]n no event
The empirical evidence, though limited, seems to point in the same direction.
One commentator has noted that "[e]mpirically, many landfills are located on
political borders." Daniel E. Ingberman, SitingNoxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient ,
29J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-20, S-23 (1995). In particular, "approximately 2/3 of
landfills in Pennsylvania are located at or near state or county boundaries." Id.
Another analyst examined the location in two northeastern states of sites listed on the
National Priorities List-the list of the most hazardous waste sites in the nation. She
found that "a number of sites were within a few miles of counties other than the one
ascribed to the site location." Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classificationin Environmental
Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 633, 650 (1994).
The implication of both works appears to be that the number was disproportionate,
though neither performed any statistical analysis.
42 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 406-11 (5th Cir.
1974), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421
U.S. 60 (1975).
1 Clean Air Act § 123(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7423(a) (1) (1994).
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may the Administrator prohibit any increase in any stack height or
44
restrict in any manner the stack height of any source."
The EPA subsequently promulgated regulations that define good
engineering practice ("GEP") as the greater of:
1. 65 meters;
2. for stacks in existence before January 12, 1979, 2.5 times

3.

the height of the facility or other nearby structure, and, for
stacks built subsequently, the height of the facility or other
nearby structure plus 1.5 times the lesser of the height or
width of the facility or other nearby structure; and
greater heights where necessary to prevent excessive
concentrations as a result of atmospheric downwash, wakes,
45
or eddy effects as a result of nearby structures.

Despite these regulations, incentives for suboptimally tall stacks
are likely to remain. To explain why, it is necessary to provide some
background on the GEP concept. GEP is not solely an engineering
concept. The higher the stack, the less a source's emissions will
affect ambient air-quality levels nearby, and the more they will affect
ambient air-quality levels farther away.46 This phenomenon gives
rise to environmental and regulatory tradeoffs, as well as an

aggregate tradeoff. The environmental tradeoff concerns the
valuations of adverse effects on public health and the environment
nearby relative to the value of adverse effects imposed farther away.

The regulatory tradeoff arises because a taller stack implies the need
for more environmental controls farther from the source and fewer
controls closer to the source.
Finally, with respect to the aggregate tradeoff, taller stacks have
higher construction and maintenance costs, which must be borne by
the source constructing the stack. If the resolution of the environmental and regulatory tradeoffs favors a shorter stack, the inquiry
should end, because there would be no socially desirable reason for
the source to expend the additional costs of building a taller stack.
' Clean Air Act § 123(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7423(c) (1994).
40 C.F.R. § 51.100(ii) (1995). For the EPA's technical background
document, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDELINE FOR DETERMINA45 See

TION OF GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICE STACK HEIGHT (TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT

FOR THE STACK HEIGHT REGULATIONS) (1985) (on file with author). For an analysis
of the evolution of the EPA's policy, see R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 123-54 (1983). For a discussion of the

extensive litigation surrounding the tall-stack regulations, see, e.g., Reitze, supra note
40, at 1597-1601; Vestigo, supra note 40, at 729-36.
46 See infra text accompanying note 136.
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In contrast, if the resolution of the environmental and regulatory
tradeoffs favors a taller stack, the socially desirable height will
depend on the comparison between the net environmental and
regulatory benefits of a taller stack and the additional costs of
building and operating such a stack.
If all adverse air-quality effects were felt within a single state, a
state regulator interested in maximizing social welfare could make
these tradeoffs in an unbiased way. As discussed above, however, if
at least some of these effects are interstate, the regulator has
incentives to externalize both the environmental and regulatory
burdens, thereby approving suboptimally high stacks.
The optimal resolution of all three tradeoffs depends on casespecific factors. The relative sizes of the exposed populations are
relevant to the environmental tradeoff because a tall stack is more
desirable if the affected population farther from the source is smaller
than the affected population closer to the source than if the converse
is true. The nature of the pollutant also affects the resolution of this
tradeoff because for a stack of a given height, different pollutants will
travel different distances.47 In addition, the tradeoff is affected by
whether the pollutant emitted by the source gets transformed into a
different pollutant as it travels through the atmosphere, as does, for
example, sulfur dioxide.4 8
The regulatory tradeoff implicates the relative pollution-control
costs of the different sources. If a source has a taller stack, the
emissions standards of other sources with impacts near to this source
could be relaxed, whereas the emissions standards of sources with
impacts farther away would need to be made more stringent. Thus,
the allocation of pollution-control burdens that minimizes the costs
of meeting the federal ambient standards depends on the relative
impacts of emissions from each of these sources on ambient air
quality, as well as on the relative marginal costs of pollution
reduction.

Finally, with respect to the aggregate tradeoff, the construction
and operation costs of taller stacks will depend on the nature of the
facility. In summary, the question of what stack height is desirable
will vary from source to source, from location to location, and from
pollutant to pollutant. The EPA's regulations, however, do not
41 For example, particulates of larger size will not travel as far as particulates of
smaller size. See Gordon H. Strom, Atmospheric Dispersion of Stack Effluents, in AIR
POLLUTION 227, 229 (Arthur C. Stern ed., 1968).
48 See infra text accompanying note 76.
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permit such case-specific inquiries. As indicated above, GEP is
defined as the largest of three dimensions: a fixed height, a multiple
of the dimensions of the source or nearby structure, and a greater
height if warranted by certain meteorological and physical factors.49
While the latter standard takes certain case-specific factors into
account, the inquiry contemplated by the regulations is far narrower
than that outlined above.
As a result, there will be instances in which a height that
conforms with the requirements of GEP nonetheless produces an
amount of interstate pollution that is suboptimal from the perspective of properly controlling the externality.5" If all of the effects of
the pollution were felt within a state, the state could, in such
circumstances, require lower stacks. Even when there are interstate
spillovers, a state has at least a partial incentive to do so as long as at
least some of the adverse effects occur in-state.
Under certain conditions, a stack conforming with the GEP
requirement might be suboptimally low. In this situation, unlike
where GEP is suboptimally high, there is only a crude corrective
mechanism. As mentioned above, the Clean Air Act provides that
while the regulations can limit the amount of credit that a source
receives from a taller stack, they cannot constrain the actual height
of the stack. Thus, if a GEP stack is suboptimally low, a source could
build a taller stack. But under the regulations, the source would be
unable to realize the full social benefits of the taller stack because
the nearby effects of the source's emissions would be calculated on
the basis of a GEP stack, rather than on the basis of the stack's actual
height.
It is now possible to examine the ways in which the statute and
regulations are likely to create incentives for stacks that are too tall.
First, as a result of the asymmetry in corrective mechanisms, it is in
fact desirable for the definition of tall stacks in the regulations to err
on the side of allowing, on average, GEP stacks to be suboptimally
tall. Regardless of whether the current scheme actually has such a
bias, it is relevant for the purposes of this discussion that a socially
optimal scheme would exhibit such characteristics.
Second, firms have the ability to affect the permissible height of
their stacks by manipulating the dimensions of their facilities or
nearby structures. Because the regulations allow pre-1979 stacks
4 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
9The determination of the stack heights necessary to minimize the costs of
meeting the federal ambient standards is discussed infra in Part II.A.2.
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to be 2.5 times the height of the facility or nearby structure and post1979 stacks to be the height of the facility times 1.5 times the lesser
of the height or width of the facility or nearby structure, larger
facilities or nearby structures permit the use of taller stacks.51
Third, the location of the plant also affects the permissible height
of the stack. The regulations allow sources to use stacks that are
taller than would otherwise be permissible if the presence of nearby
structures would produce excessive concentrations as a result of
atmospheric downwash, wakes or eddy effects. For this reason, too,
the definition of GEP is manipulable, and the desire to externalize
the adverse consequences of pollution might lead states to create
incentives for taller stacks.
Fourth, ironically, regulatory provisions concerning stack height
have been interpreted in a way that understates the impact of
interstate emissions. This phenomenon arises because the statute
limits only the credit in terms of emissions reductions that sources
can get for tall stacks, but does not limit the height of the stacks
themselves.52 Thus, if the height exceeds GEP, the impact of
emissions on air quality nearby will be calculated on the basis of a
GEP stack, rather than on the basis of the actual height. Therefore,
under this calculation, the source's impact on nearby ambient air
quality will be greater than the actual impact of these emissions.
Farther from the source, however, the opposite is true: the actual
impact will be greater than the calculated impact. At least one court
has deferred to the EPA's method of determining the effects of using
the GEP impact even when the resulting calculation of impact is less
than the actual impact.5" This procedure understates the impact of
emissions from tall stacks on ambient air quality far from the source.
Such an understatement makes tall stacks more desirable to the
upwind state than they would otherwise be because it allows greater
externalization of the consequences of in-state pollution.

51

See supra text accompanying note 45.

52 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.

" See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 1982) (Connecticut I) (noting
that employing "good engineering practice stack height" was not an abuse of EPA

discretion when the EPA "also considered additional evaluations using
height").

...
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3. Acid-Rain Provisions
At best, the acid-rain provisions of the 1990 amendments 54 are
an incomplete mechanism for dealing with interstate externalities.
They apply to only two pollutants: sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxides. 5 Further, they apply to only one type of facility: electric
utilities.56
Moreover, these provisions are not structured to allocate
emissions between upwind and downwind states in a desirable
manner. With respect to nitrogen oxides, the provisions set
emissions standards for new and existing sources.5 7 As discussed
above, emissions standards are not a well-targeted means for
controlling interstate externalities.5 8
The acid-rain provisions create a national marketable-permit
scheme for sulfur dioxide. Phase I of the scheme, which went into
effect in 1995, applies only to 110 major polluters. 9 It allocates to
each utility a yearly allowance of 2.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide for
each million BTUs of fuel input consumed, on average from 1985 to
1987.60 Phase II, which will go into effect in the year 2000, covers
virtually every electric utility in the country and allocates to each a
yearly allowance of 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide per million BTUs,
based also on their fuel use from 1985 to 1987.61 For both phases,
the allowances are tradeable in a single, national market.6 2
Although these decreases in the allowable emissions of sulfur
dioxide are likely to reduce the amount of acid rain, particularly
after the year 2000, they make no attempt to allocate emissions
5' SeeClean Air Act §§ 401-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-51o (1994). For discussion of the
scientific basis of the acid-rain problem, see J. Laurence Kulp, Acid Rain: Causes,
Effects, and Contro4 REGULATION, Winter 1990, at 41, 41-43.
11 See Clean Air Act § 401(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (1994).
56 See
17 See

id.
Clean Air Act § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 7651f (1994).

58 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. A similar objection can be raised
against a provision, added in the 1990 amendments, controlling interstate ozone
pollution on the eastern seaboard. See Clean Air Act § 184, 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (1994).
For a discussion of this provision, see Michael C. Naughton, Note, Establishinglnterstate
Markets for Emissions Trading of Ozone Precursors, 3 N.Y.U. ENVrL. LJ. 195, 228-32
(1994).
"9 See PETER S. MENELL & RIcHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY
408 (1994).
60 See id.
61 See id. at 409.
62 For further discussion, see Jeanne M. Dennis, Comment, Smoke for Sale:
Paradoxesand Problems of the Emissions Trading Programof the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1118-27 (1993).
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between upwind states and downwind states in an optimal way. The
acid-rain problem manifests itself primarily in the Northeast, but is
caused primarily by emissions from the Midwest. Because the market
is national, Midwestern sources could buy, without restriction,
permits from the West and the Northeast.63 Such trades would have
an undesirable impact in the Northeast. In fact, downwind states are
attempting to prevent their sources from selling permits to upwind
sources, though such measures may well be struck down on constitu64
tional grounds.
4. Interstate Spillover Provisions
Section 110(a) (2) (D), which was codified as section 110(a) (2) (E)
until the 1990 amendments, and section 126(b), which dates to the
1977 amendments, are the most comprehensive means for controlling interstate spillovers. The House Report accompanying these
provisions expressed the view that the 1970 version of these provisions, which relied solely on intergovernmental cooperation on the
part of the state governments, with no federal role, was "an inade65
quate answer to the problem of interstate air pollution."
Section 110(a) (2) (D), in its 1977 version, sets forth as one of the
conditions for the approval of SIPs by the EPA that:
[SIPs] contain[] adequate provisions (i) prohibiting any stationary
source within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts
which will (I) prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State
of any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard, or (II) interfere with measures required to be included
in the applicable implementation plan for any other State under
[the PSD provisions] to prevent significant deterioration of air
quality or to protect visibility .... 66

1 Such trades, however, cannot lead to violations of the NAAQS. See Clean Air Act
§ 403(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(g) (1994).
1 For discussion, see Russell Korobkin, Note, Sulfur Dioxide and the Constitution:
LegalDoctrine and Responses to the CleanAirAct Amendments of 1990, 13 STAN. ENVrL. L.J.
349 (1994).
6 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1977),
reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.6.N. 1077, 1409. For other legislative history, see H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 564,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 145-46 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1502, 1525-27; S.
REP. NO. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1977). For academic criticism of the pre1977 approach, see William V. Luneburg, The National Quest for Clean Air 1970-1978:
IntergovernmentalProblems and Some Proposed Solutions, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 397, 400-21
(1978).
6 Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (E) (1988), amended by
Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (1994).
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The 1990 amendments left prong (II) unchanged.6 7 With respect
to prong (I), the "prevent attainment or maintenance by any other
State" language was changed to "contribute significantly to non6
attainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State.",
As discussed below, this change appears9 to codify the existing
administrative and judicial interpretation.6
In turn, the 1977 version of section 126(b) provided that "[a]ny
State or political subdivision may petition the Administrator for a
finding that any major source emits or would emit any air pollutant
in violation of the prohibition of section [110] (a) (2) (E) (i) ."71 This
section was amended only in minor respects in 1990.71
Unlike the federal ambient and emissions standards, the
interstate spillover provisions are designed to prevent excessive
pollution (however that term might be defined) from crossing
interstate borders. Unlike the tall-stack and acid-rain provisions, they
are designed to deal with the problem comprehensively. The
discussion that follows analyzes and criticizes the administrative
practice and case law that has developed under these provisions.

7 See Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (D) (i) (II), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (II)
(1994).
' Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (D) (i) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i) (I) (1994).
The full provision now requires SIPs to:
(D) contain adequate provisions(i) prohibiting, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter,
any source or other type of emissions activity within the State
from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere
with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any
such national primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard, or
(II) interfere with measures required to be included in the
applicable implementation plan for any other State
under [the PSD provisions] to prevent significant deterioration of air quality or to protect visibility ....

Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (1994).
See infra text accompanying notes 99-100.

70 Clean Air Act § 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1988).
' It now provides that "[any State or political subdivision may petition the
Administrator for a finding that any major source or group of stationary sources emits
or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition of section
[110] (a) (2) (D) (ii)." Clean Air Act § 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1994).
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C. Administrative andJudicial Interpretation
of the Interstate Spillover Provisions

This section analyzes the substantive standards that the EPA and
the courts have fashioned to guide proceedings under sections
110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b). Before discussing these standards,
however, it is necessary to provide some background on several
threshold issues. With respect to both the threshold issues and the
substantive standards, the EPA and the courts have placed considerable roadblocks in the path of downwind states seeking to constrain
upwind pollution. Indeed, despite the congressional concern over
the problem of interstate externalities, which led to the enactment
in 1977 of sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b), no downwind state has
72
ever prevailed on a claim alleging excessive upwind pollution.
1. Threshold Issues
The first threshold issue concerns the models the EPA uses to
predict the impact of upwind emissions on ambient air quality in the
downwind state. The EPA has maintained that it cannot predict such
impacts more than 50 kilometers (about 30 miles) from the source
of the pollution, 73 and has summarily rejected the predictions made
by downwind states on the basis of longer-range models. 74 Thus,
sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b) have been of no use to downwind
72 See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (New York III), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). For academic
discussion decrying the lack of effectiveness of these provisions, seeJ.B. Ruhl, Interstate
Pollution Control and Resource Development Planning: Outmoded Approaches or Outmoded
Politics?,28 NAT. RESoURcESJ. 293, 296-300 (1988); Kay M. Crider, Note, InterstateAir
Pollution: Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 619, 624-39
(1988); Timothy Talkington, Comment, InterstateAir PollutionAbatement and the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990: Balancing Interests, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 957, 959-71
(1991).
I See New York v. EPA, 716 E2d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1983) (New York 11)
(deferring to the EPA's use of a short-range model); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200,
1204 (6th Cir. 1983) (New York 1) (same).
At least in the case of nitrogen oxides, the EPA is currently attempting to quantify
the impact of emissions at distances of several hundred kilometers. SeeApproval and
Promulgation of Section 182(f) Exemption to the Nitrogen Oxides (NO.) Control
Requirements for the Baton Rouge Ozone Nonattainment Area; Louisiana, 61 Fed.
Reg. 2438, 2440 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
4 See Talkington, supra note 72, at 969-71. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA
appears to employ a similar technique, arguing that the upstream pollution does not
lead to a "detectable violation" of the downstream state's water quality standards. See,
e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 97 (1992).
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states challenging pollution from sources not immediately contiguous
to their borders.
The second threshold issue relates to the treatment of pollutants
that are transformed as they travel through the atmosphere. In
particular, sulfur dioxide emissions become sulfates, which affect the
ambient air-quality levels of total suspended particulates. 5 Thus,
increased sulfur dioxide emissions upwind have an effect downwind
not only on ambient air-quality levels of sulfur dioxide, but also on
ambient air-quality levels of particulates. The EPA has consistently
taken the position, which has been upheld by the courts, that the
impact of transformed pollution need not be taken into account in
evaluating whether the upwind pollution is excessive. Thus, the
phenomenon of acid rain, an important manifestation of the
problem of interstate pollution, has been largely outside the reach
of sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b).7
Third, the EPA has not set an ambient air-quality standard for
sulfates," even though a relative consensus developed within the
scientific community in the 1980s concerning the adverse environmental effects of acid rain.'8 Nor has the EPA promulgated
regulations to combat regional haze,79 despite a statutory obligation
under section 169A to do so by 1979.80 Had the EPA done so, it
would have been required by sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b) to
take into account the impact of upwind emissions of sulfur dioxide
on the downwind ambient air-quality levels of sulfates as well as their
impact on regional haze."'
7' SeeJerome Ostrov, InterboundaryStationarySource Pollution-CleanAir Act Section

126 and Beyond, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 37, 41 n.14, 48-50 (1982).
76 See New York II, 716 E2d at 443; New York I, 710 F2d at 1204. The Second
Circuit, however, expressed reservations about the EPA's treatment of transformed
pollution in Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F2d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 1982) (Connecticut I1).
7 See Connecticut II, 696 E2d at 164-65 (stating that the "EPA, as yet, has no
adequate model to predict the likelihood of [sulfates]"); BRUcE A. ACKERnAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DRTY AIR 65-72 (1981).
7 See Kulp, supra note 54, at 41; Valerie Lee, Interstate Sulfate Pollution: Proposed
Amendments to the Clean Air Act 5 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 71, 72-76 (1981).
79 See New York v. EPA, 852 E2d 574, 578-79 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (New York I1)
(stating that "'visibility measures at this time do not address regional haze'" (quoting
49 Fed. Reg. 48,153 (1984))), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Vermont v. Thomas,
850 E2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that "no 'plain meaning' to regulate regional
haze can be discerned from the face of the [1980] regulations").
' SeeClean AirAct § 169A(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a) (4) (1994). In Thomas, 850 E2d
at 104, the Second Circuit expressed concern that "more than ten years after the
enactment of section 169A, there is still no national program addressing regional
haze." The EPA currently estimates that it will promulgate such regulations by
January 31, 1997. See 60 Fed. Reg. 60,604, 60,685 (1995).
s See New York IfI, 852 F2d at 578-79; Thomas, 850 E2d at 104; New York v. EPA,
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Finally, the EPA has taken the position, which the courts have
upheld, that the cumulative impacts of upwind sources are not
cognizable in a section 110(a) (2) (D) proceeding. In such proceedings, the downwind states challenge the EPA's approval of a SIP
revision for an upwind state; under the prevailing administrative and
judicial approach, only the impacts of the source (or sources) subject
to the revision can be challenged.12 As is discussed below, upwind
pollution that exacerbates a violation of the federal ambient
standards in the downwind state is deemed excessive only if it makes
a "significant contribution" to the violation.8" For example, the EPA
has determined that contributions of 1.5% and 3% are not significant. 84 By allowing contributions of these magnitudes from single
sources without inquiring about the number of other sources
affecting the ambient air-quality levels in the downwind state, the
EPA may be permitting large cumulative amounts of interstate
spillovers.8" This approach also creates incentives for those seeking
SIP revisions having interstate impacts to deal only with single
sources, thereby masking potentially large cumulative impacts.
While the EPA allows the consideration of cumulative impacts in
actions under section 126(b),86 it has placed the burden of producing the facts needed to support the requested action on the
downwind state, as the proponent of agency action.87 In contrast,
under section 110(a) (2) (D), the "burden of compiling an adequate
record to support [a] SIP revision is placed on the ... state" seeking
the revision-the upwind state.8 8
2. Substantive Standards
To understand the administrative and judicial interpretations of
the substantive standards, it is helpful to construct a taxonomy
defined by reference to whether the downwind state would meet the
federal ambient standards if it did not have to face pollution

716 F.2d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 1983) (New York fi); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200, 1204
(6th Cir. 1983) (New York 1).
82 See New York I, 710 F.2d at 1203-04; Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 908-09 (2d
Cir. 1981) (Connecticut I).
' See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
84 See infra text accompanying notes 101-02 (discussing contributions
found not
significant).
15See Talkington, supra note 72, at 968-72.
1 See sources cited supra note 82.
87See 49 Fed. Reg. 48,152, 48,154 (1984); 47 Fed. Reg. 6624, 6626 (1982).
81 New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200, 1203 (6th Cir. 1983) (New York 1).
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transported from the upwind state and whether the downwind state
actually meets the federal ambient standards despite the upwind
pollution. There are three relevant categories.
In the first category, the downwind state would meet the federal
ambient standards without the upwind pollution, and meets these
standards despite the upwind pollution. In the second category, the
downwind state would not meet the federal ambient standards even
if there were no upwind pollution and, of course, does not meet the
standards with the upwind pollution. In the third category, the
downwind state would meet the federal ambient standards in the
absence of upwind pollution, but does not meet these standards with
the upwind pollution; here, the upwind pollution is the but-for cause
of the violation of the federal ambient standards. This taxonomy is
summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: TAXONOMY OF INTERSTATE SPILLOVERS

Violation Without
Upwind Pollution

Violation with
Upwind Pollution

Category I

No

No

Category II

Yes

Yes

Category III

No

Yes

As to each of these categories, two questions are relevant. First,
should the federal government play a role in controlling the upwind
pollution? Second, assuming that such a role is appropriate, how
should the federal government determine the permissible amount of
upwind pollution that can enter the downwind state? The discussion
that follows considers the principles that ultimately emerged during
the Reagan Administration from the administrative and judicial
treatment of these issues, as well as the approach taken during the
Carter Administration, which was more sympathetic to the interests
of downwind states.
In Category I, absent a violation of the federal ambient standards-either the NAAQS or the PSD increments-the EPA will place
no limits on the upwind pollution. 9 In this situation, the upwind

" See, e.g., Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1085-88 (6th Cir.
1984) (Jefferson County) (rejectingJefferson County's margin-for-growth argument on
the grounds that it attempts to "establish a local air quality standard that is more
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pollution will be unconstrained even if it leads to a violation of a state
ambient standard in the downwind state,9" even if the downwind
state desires to preserve a margin for growth,9" and even if the
downwind state has been unable to place at least some constraint on
its environmental degradation by setting a baseline under the PSD
92
program.
Since the Reagan Administration, the EPA has claimed that this
approach is compelled by the statutory focus on upwind pollution
stringent than the national standard"); Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir.
1981) (Connecticut 1) ("Nothing in the Act... indicates that a state must respect its
neighbor's air quality standards ... if those standards are more stringent than the
requirements of federal law."); 49 Fed. Reg. 34,851, 34,858 (1984).
90 See Connecticut I, 656 F.2d at 910 (holding that the "EPA is not obligated to
consider state law before approving [a) SIP revision").
9 SeeJefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1085-88. In this case, an electric utility in Indiana
had a large effect on the margin for growth for sulfur dioxide in Jefferson County,
Kentucky. For example, an EPA study found that, with respect to two out of the three
NAAQS for sulfur dioxide, 34.5% and 46.8%, respectively, of the permissible pollution
levels in a portion of Jefferson County were consumed by this plant. See Hearing
Notice, 45 Fed. Reg. 17,048, 17,048-49 (1980); see also Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at
1078. While the air quality in this part ofJefferson County was better than the federal
ambient standards, the county as a whole was classified as nonattainment. The EPA
determined that, as a nonattainment area, Jefferson County was not subject to any
PSD requirement, and therefore that the Indiana utility's emissions could not
"interfere" with PSD measures. 47 Fed. Reg. 6624, 6625 (1982).
92 See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1085-88. In a case in which the downwind state
had established a baseline, the EPA concluded that upwind pollution may "consume
a portion of the allowable PSD increment, but in general unless it causes that
increment to be exceeded, it will not trigger section 126 relief." 49 Fed. Reg. 34,851,
34,858 (1984). Under this reasoning, even where the downwind state has an
established PSD program, the upwind state can destroy the PSD increment-and
therefore the downwind state's margin for growth-with no constraint, provided that
the increment is not actually violated. This decision was upheld in New York v. EPA,
852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (New York Ill), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
An earlier case had taken a position more sympathetic to the interests of the
downwind states:
[A] situation could arise where, because of the absence of a baseline in one
state, a nearby state could continue to export pollution until the affected
state's concentration of a specific pollutant reached the NAAQSs. Thereafter, if a baseline were set, the affected state would be unable to permit
additional pollution within its own PSD increment because any further
[pollution] would violate the NAAQSs. The PSD increment in effect would
have been consumed by the nearby state.
Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 1982) (Connecticut I1). The court also
noted that states that are not subject to PSD requirements even though they have airquality levels that are better than the NAAQS may nonetheless have taken voluntary
measures to prevent the deterioration of their air quality. The court referred to the
"danger" of allowing upwind pollution to interfere with such state-imposed measures.
Id.
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that "prevent[s] the attainment or maintenance" of the NAAQS or
"interfere[s] with measures required" by the PSD program. If the
NAAQS are being attained, the Agency reasoned, the upwind
pollution is not "prevent[ing]" their "attainment or maintenance."9 3
Similarly, if the PSD increment is not violated, the upwind pollution
is not "interfer[ing]" with any measures "required" by the PSD
program. 94 The 1990 amendments are unlikely to affect the
treatment of cases in which there is no violation of the ambient
standards downwind, as the pertinent language concerning
"interfer[ence]" with PSD provisions remains unchanged. 95
In contrast to the Reagan Administration's constrained view of
the reach of the Clean Air Act's interstate spillover provisions, during
the Carter Administration the EPA took the position, in the context
of an action under section 126(b), that these provisions protected
state ambient standards that were more stringent than the federal
standards.9 6 Moreover, in dicta, the Second Circuit stated, relying
in part on the legislative history of section 126(b), 91 that while the
13

See 49 Fed. Reg. 48,152, 48,154-55 (1984).

94See id.

9-See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
11 The EPA had stated that these provisions "are designed to protect against
interstate interference with State or local ambient air standards or other measures
more stringent than necessary to attain federal standards." Hearing Notice, 45 Fed.
Reg. 72,702, 72,707 (1980). Opening a hearing in the Jefferson County case, David
Hawkins, the Carter Administration's Assistant Administrator of the EPA for Air,
Noise, and Radiation, stated:
EPA's interpretation of the interstate pollution provisions is that they
provide protection against national ambient air quality standards violations
and protection against unreasonable interference with a maintenance
program or marginfor growth in the State Implementation Plan....
...
In addition, the Agency believes that the provisions are designed to
protect against interstate interference with State or local ambient air quality
standards or other measures more stringent than necessary to attain the
Federal standards.
Public Hearing on Interstate Pollution Abatement Petition from Jefferson County,
Kentucky 6-7 (April 17, 1980) (on file with author) (emphasis added). This
proceeding, however, was not completed during the Carter Administration. I am
grateful to Charles Carter, Esq., for having made available to me, when he was
Assistant General Counsel of the EPA, the full administrative record in the Jefferson
County case.
" The House Report accompanying the 1977 amendments provides:
The committee intends that the prohibition against interstate pollution
which interferes with prevention of significant deterioration plans in new
section 110(a)(2)(E) and new section 126 of the act be construed as
including a prohibition on interstate pollution which prevents timely
attainment or maintenance of State or local ambient air quality standards or
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EPA was not required to consider the impact of upwind pollution on
the state ambient standards of a downwind state, it had the discretion
to do so.9 8

In Category II cases, where the upwind pollution exacerbates a
violation of a federal ambient standard in the downwind state, the
EPA has determined that the upwind pollution should be constrained
only if it constitutes a "significant contribution" to the downwind
state's violation, and the courts have upheld the EPA's position. 9
The 1990 amendments codify this interpretation. 0 0
The EPA has never found upwind pollution to meet this standard
and has given little guidance on what factors distinguish a "significant" contribution from an "insignificant" one. In cases involving a
single upwind source, the EPA concluded that contributions of
1.5%10' and 3%102 were not significant. It reached these conclusions with no analysis, apparently basing its determination on the fact
that those percentages did not seem particularly large. Nor did the
EPA engage in any inquiry as to the cumulative impacts of upwind
emissions. In light of the large number of sources that are likely to
other measures adopted under section 116 of the act. The prohibition
should also be construed to protect state or local plans to prevent significant
deterioration which are more stringent than is required by... the act.
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 331 n.14 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.CA N. 1077, 1410 n.14.
9 See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 910 (2d Cir. 1981) (Connecticut 1).
9 See Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 E2d 1071, 1093 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Jefferson County) (concluding that "the proper test to be applied in evaluating the
section 126 petition is whether [the offender's] emissions 'significandy contribute' to
...violations"); 49 Fed. Reg. 34,851, 34,859 (1984) (emphasizing that a state may
contend that an "out-of-State source prevents it from meeting" federal air-quality
standards "only if that source makes a significant contribution to the levels of
pollution that cause a ...violation").
In the first case in which the issue arose, the Second Circuit refused to adopt the
EPA's "significant contribution" test, but nonetheless upheld the Agency's decision on
the basis of a de minimis exception. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 164-65 (2d
Cir. 1982) (Connecticut I1).
100See supra text accompanying notes 66-69 (detailing the changes made by the
1990 amendments).
See Connecticut II, 696 F.2d at 165 (upholding the EPA's determination that a
NewYork firm's emissions of 1.5% of Connecticut's federal air-quality standards would
not "prevent the attainment" of the federal standards in that state).
102See Jefferson County, 739 F.2d at 1092-93. The downwind claims in this case
seemed particularly strong because the Gallagher source, an electric utility in the
upwind state, was permitted to have sulfur dioxide emissions of 6.0 lbs./MBTU-a
standard that it could meet with no controls at all-whereas the electric utility in
Jefferson County, in the downwind state, had spent $138 million installing scrubbers
in order to meet a standard of 1.2 lbs./MBTU. See id. at 1076-77.
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affect ambient air-quality levels in the downwind state, this approach
is quite unprotective of the interests of downwind states.
Although the EPA did, in a different proceeding, set forth a list
of criteria for determining when a contribution is significant, including the relative stringencies of state regulations and the relative costs
of pollution controls in the upwind and downwind states,103 it has
never actually applied these factors. Also, while the EPA has
indicated that " [t] o be 'significant,' a contribution from a very large
area must have a distinctly larger impact on nonattainment or PSD
10s See 49

Fed. Reg. 34,851, 34,859 (1984). The EPA stated:
In determining that a contribution is significant, the Administrator will take
the following factors, among others, into account:
the location of the named source;
the nature and degree of the violation; its extensiveness; the number of
violations to which the named source has or may have contributed;
the amounts or volumes contributed by the named source as compared
with the amounts and volumes contributed by in-State and unnamed out-ofState sources;
the relative stringencies of the pollution controls placed on in-State
sources compared to those placed upon out-of-State sources; the use of the
best available control technologies on those sources;
the historical record of the petitioning State and the nained source
State with respect to meeting national ambient air quality objectives;
projections concerning future violations or attainments absent a Section
126 determination;
the degree to which a named source meets SIP requirements in its own
State;
the degree to which that source uses its allowable emission quota;
the types of sources involved and the dates they begin to emit;
the relative costs of pollution abatement between sources that
contribute to a violation.

Id.
During the Carter Administration, the EPA suggested that a similar inquiry might
be appropriate to determine when upwind pollution is excessive. In listing the set of
issues to be addressed at a hearing, the Agency stated that one possibility would be to
"requir[e] generally comparable emission limits for comparable sources in both States.
In determining a comparable emissions limit for the contested source, the Administrator would consider the air-quality impacts permitted comparable sources in each State
and emissions limits required for similar sources in similar areas." Hearing Notice,
45 Fed. Reg. 17,048, 17,049 (1980). The EPA also inquired about how differences in
emissions levels should be compared against the estimated air- quality impacts of instate and comparable out-of-state sources, and whether it would be appropriate to
require regionally uniform emissions limits or uniform control technologies. See id.
at 17,049-50. Unlike the approach adopted during the Reagan Administration, see
supra text accompanying notes 89-95, this inquiry would not have been confined to
cases in which the federal ambient standards in the downwind state are violated. This
proceeding, however, was not completed during the Carter Administration. See supra
note 96.

2370

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 2341

programs than a contribution from a single source," ' 4 the Agency
has yet to explain the relationship between the size of the area and
the magnitude of a "significant contribution."
Moreover, the EPA has not indicated what remedy would be
appropriate in the event that upwind pollution were found to
constitute a "significant contribution" to a violation. Would the
Agency then enjoin only the upwind contribution that exceeds the
threshold for significance, or would all the upwind pollution be
enjoined?
In Category III, the EPA has indicated that the plain meaning of
the statutory phrase "prevent attainment" requires the Agency to
deem excessive any upwind pollution that was the but-for cause of a
violation of the federal ambient standards in the downwind state.105
The courts have accepted this position, though in dicta."0 6 In the
only case in which the situation was presented, however, the Agency
rejected the downwind claim, stating that it doubted the accuracy of
the modeling analysis performed by the downwind state."0 7
49 Fed. Reg. 34,851, 34,864 (1984).
105The EPA's regulations under the Clean Water Act provide for the denial of
permits to sources in upstream states if their effluents would produce a violation of
the water quality standard of a downstream state. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.
91, 103 (1992) (noting that the Clean Water Act "appears to prohibit the issuance of
any federal license or permit over the objection of an affected State unless compliance
with the affected State's water quality requirements can be ensured"); Champion Int'l
Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, in Category III, upstream
pollution is constrained. The EPA has not indicated how it Wvould treat Category I
and Category II. For commentary on the issues raised by the Arkansas v. Oklahoma
litigation, see Maria V. Maurrasse, Comment, Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water
Act Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is There Still Room Left for Federal
Common Law, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1137 (1991); Thomas E. Osment, Jr., Note,
Congress Has Entrusted the EPA, Not the Courts, with the Final Word on Federal Water
Pollution Regulatory Law, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 117 (1992).
From the perspective of the analysis of interstate externalities, the legal regime
under the Clean Water Act is somewhat different from that of the Clean Air Act. Most
importantly, states have considerable discretion in their choice of water quality
standards-the analog to ambient standards-although the standards must be
approved by the EPA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 131.1-.22 (1995).
The discretion of the states in choosing water-quality standards affects both the wealthmaximization analysis, see infra Part II.B, and the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
see infra Part III.B.3.
106 See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 1982) (Connecticut I1).
107 See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,851, 34,860-61 (1984) (recognizing the limitations and
preliminary nature of the modeling analysis). The EPA's decision was upheld by the
D.C. Circuit. See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (New York II1),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
104
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The 1990 amendments, which substitute "contribute significantly
to nonattainment" for "prevent attainment," are unlikely to change
the approach of the EPA and the courts."' If the upwind pollution
is the but-for cause of the nonattainment status, such pollution is
contributing exclusively to nonattainment.
In summary, three principal rules emerge from the administrative
and judicial interpretations of section 110(a) (2) (D): upwind
pollution is never constrained if the downwind state meets the
federal ambient standards; upwind pollution that exacerbates a
violation of the federal ambient standards in the downwind states is
constrained only if the upwind sources "significantly contribute" to
the violation; and upwind pollution that is the but-for cause of the
violation of federal ambient standards in the downwind state is always
constrained.
The combination of these rules leads to illogical and undesirable
results. Consider first the Category I case of a downwind state that
is not violating the NAAQS or the PSD increments. The amount by
which the downwind state's ambient air-quality levels are better than
the federal ambient standards represents that state's margin for
growth. If the downwind state is not able to attract new sources,
because, for example, it is experiencing a temporary economic
downturn, the rules allow an upwind state to consume the downwind
state's margin for growth without constraint by adding additional
sources."0 9 Indeed, the rules even allow an upwind state to consume the downwind state's margin for growth by amending its SIP to
permit its existing sources to increase their emissions up to the point
at which the federal ambient standards become constraining in the
downwind state."'0 Once the air-quality levels in the downwind
state reach the level of the federal ambient standards (with the help
of the upwind state), the downwind state will be unable to attract any
sources without requiring emissions reductions from its existing
sources. At the extreme, a downwind state with no existing industrial
base would be precluded from ever acquiring one.
In contrast, if the downwind state consumes its margin for growth
first, either by attracting new sources or by amending its SIP to allow
existing sources to pollute more, any increase in the pollution that
10sSee

supra text accompanying notes 66-69 (detailing the changes made by the

1990 amendments).
'o See Crider, supra note 72, at 629-31.
11 Of course, this strategy can be followed only if it does not lead to a violation
of the federal ambient standards in the upwind state.
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the upwind state sends downwind would be deemed a violation of

section 110(a) (2) (D). An upwind state without an industrial base at
the time that the downwind state reaches the federal ambient
standards might be effectively precluded by this rule from attracting

any polluting sources in the future if, as a result of the state's
geography, any in-state emissions would be likely to migrate
downwind.
Accordingly, the margin for growth in the downwind state would
be allocated on a "first-come-first-served" basis."1 '
Such rules
of capture are undesirable; they create incentives for both upwind and downwind states to use the downwind state's margin for
growth at a faster rate than is economically desirable, and do not
allocate this margin for growth to the state that values it most highly.
The discussion so far has focused on a downwind state that
intends to use its margin for growth for economic expansion.
Instead, states might set state ambient standards that are more
stringent than the federal standards because they attach more value
to environmental protection.
The federal environmental laws
emphasize, as explicitly reflected in section 116, that federal
standards are floors and not ceilings, and that states remain free to
enact standards that are more stringent than the federal standards."' Under the dominant race-to-the-bottom and interstate
externality justifications for vesting responsibility for environmental
regulation at the federal level,"' the evil to be remedied is underregulation on the part of the states, not overregulation. Under both

"' In January 1980, the EPA proposed to approve a variance to the New York SIP
that allowed the Consolidated Edison Company, an electric utility, to use, for one
year, fuel oil with a sulfur content of 1.5% in three facilities. See 45 Fed. Reg. 3331,
3331-32 (1980). The EPA found that the variance would not lead to any violation of
the NAAQS or PSD increments in other states. See id. at 3332. Several comments
filed in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking objected to a "first-come-firstserved" approach to regional growth, under which a downwind state could lose its
margin for growth if the upwind state used it first. See 45 Fed. Reg. 26,101, 26,101
(1980). In rejecting these comments, the EPA reasoned that Con Edison would not
be in a position to take the margin for growth in the downwind states on a "firstcome-first-served" basis, because any new source in the downwind state could trump
a further extension of the Con Edison variance. See 45 Fed. Reg. 53,138, 53,140
(1980). Interestingly, given the EPA's stated opposition to "first-come-first-served"
allocations, this reasoning would have created a "first-come-first-served" right for the
downwind sources.
"I See Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994). This principle is subject only
to narrow qualification in cases such as emissions standards for automobiles, where
national uniformity is considered desirable to capture economies of scale in the
production process. See id.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
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of these rationales, states should be encouraged to regulate more
stringently if their preferences for environmental protection are
stronger than those reflected in the federal standards, or if their
costs of pollution reduction are lower than average. As discussed in
Part II, more stringent standards are undesirable only if they are an
effort to externalize to other states the costs of pollution control."l 4
Under the current administrative andjudicial approach, however,
more stringent state ambient standards can be used only to limit the
emissions of in-state sources and cannot be invoked, under any
circumstances, to constrain upwind emissions. Such a regime creates
a disincentive for downwind states to have more stringent state
ambient standards: downwind states bear all the costs of such
standards (the costs of tougher emissions limitations for in-state
sources), but the upwind states can appropriate the benefit by taking
the additional opportunities created for the externalization of
pollution.- '
The administrative and judicial approach to Category II situations, in which the upwind pollution aggravates a violation of the
federal ambient standards, also is misguided. In Category II cases,
the downwind state would be unable to constrain the upwind
pollution unless the pollution was deemed a "significant contribution" to the violation. 6 Under the nonattainment provisions of
the Clean Air Act, however, the downwind state has an obligation to
reduce its emissions until it meets the NAAQS. Thus, absent a
"significant contribution" from upwind sources, the full burden of
pollution reduction falls initially on the downwind sources, even if
upwind reductions would be far less costly.
But once the downwind state made sufficient improvements so
that it could meet the NAAQS were it not for the upwind pollution,
the situation would change. The upwind pollution would then be
the but-for cause of the violation of the NAAQS in the downwind
state-a Category III problem. The upwind pollution would be
enjoined as "prevent[ing] the attainment" of the NAAQS, even if the
costs to the upwind state of doing so were wholly disproportionate to
the costs to the downwind state of somewhat more stringent pollution
controls. As already indicated, in cases in which all emissions from
the upwind state have at least some impact downwind, such a rule
14

"
"6

See infra Part II.B.
See Ruhl, supra note 72, at 307.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
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would prevent any polluting activity in the upwind state." 7 The
downwind state, by reducing its emissions to the point at which it
could meet the NAAQS in the absence of the upwind pollution, but
no further, could effectively destroy the upwind state's industrial
8

base."1
In summary, of the three rules articulated by the EPA and the
courts to address the problem of interstate spillovers, two are overly
lenient and one is too harsh. It is undesirable to have no constraints
on upwind pollution absent a violation of the federal ambient
standards. Further, at least in its application, the "significant
contribution" rule has allowed excessive upwind pollution. In
contrast, the rule banning any upwind pollution that is the but-for
cause of a violation of the federal ambient standards is unduly
stringent.119
II.

INTERNALIZING THE INTERSTATE EXTERNALITIES

This Part seeks to develop a sound means to force the internalization of interstate environmental externalities in a federal system.
The analysis focuses on how to perform such internalization within
the context of the Clean Air Act's requirement that states meet the
federal ambient standards. The discussion contemplates a procedure
like the one provided by the Act's sections 110(a) (2) (D) and
126(b),' 20 under which downwind states can seek injunctions
against upwind pollution.
The presence of interstate externalities constitutes a market
failure. In the absence of other market failures or public choice
117 See

supra text accompanying notes 110-11.

118In formulating this rule, the Second Circuit also considered a different

scenario, under which, as a result of the upwind pollution, the downwind state could
not meet the NAAQS under its then-prevailing standards for in-state sources, but
could meet the NAAQS if it tightened up those standards. The court noted that
under a literal reading of the word "prevent," there would be no violation of this
section unless it was impossible for the downwind state to meet the NAAQS even by
imposing more stringent control measures on its own sources. Rejecting this
interpretation, the court stated that the interstate pollution provisions of the Act
"were designed to ensure that one state would not be able to foist its pollution on
another state and accordingly require that state to tighten its regulations to keep its
air clean." Connecticut v. EPA, 696 .2d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 1982) (Connecticut II). The
court never made the connection that under its but-for cause rule, the downwind state
could foist on the upwind state the full cost of the downwind state's failure to impose
more stringent controls on its sources.
119See supratext accompanying notes 105-08.
I" Clean Air Act §§ 110(a) (2) (D), 126(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a) (2) (D), 7426(b)
(1994).
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problems, correcting the externality leads to the maximization of
social welfare. Under the approach contemplated here, however, this
maximization is constrained by a requirement that the federal
ambient standards be met, so social welfare gains that might result
from ambient standards less stringent than the federal standards
cannot be considered.
This objective of maximizing social welfare subject to a constraint
is different from the objective of minimizing the costs of meeting the
federal ambient standards because the states are free to choose more
stringent state ambient standards.12 1 In cases in which the federal
ambient standards are constraining (that is, ambient air quality has
been degraded to the level of these standards), the welfare-maximization and cost-minimization objectives yield identical results.
The analysis that follows assumes that there are no Coasian
bargaining solutions under which states could limit their pollution
spillovers through interstate compacts without any federal intervention. If transaction costs were sufficiently low to permit such
bargaining, there would be no need for federal regulation. 22
is necessary precisely
Federal regulation of interstate externalities
123
because such bargaining does not occur.
Section A considers the situation in which the federal ambient
standards in the downwind state are violated and in which the
Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994).
11 SeeJacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the ProperScope of the Federal
Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 573-74 (1994). LeBoeuf notes: "The
objection that the bargaining suggested by the Coase theorem would obviate federal
intervention is in a sense nothing more than a dispute over semantics. Congress is,
in a sense, the forum wherein states hammer out their differences." Id. at 574.
12 Thus, for example, the provisions that preceded sections 110(a) (2) (D) and
126(b), which relied on intergovernmental cooperation, were wholly ineffective. See
supra text accompanying note 65.
Several reasons might explain why transaction costs are sufficiently high to
prevent the formation of compacts. First, the baselines are not well defined in the
current legal regime. Does an upwind state have the right to send pollution
downwind unconstrained? Alternatively, does the downwind state have the right to
enjoin all upwind pollution? Second, for different pollution problems, the range of
affected states will vary. This shifting membership makes less likely the emergence of
relationships favoring cooperation. Third, the causation questions are not likely to
be straightforward. Considerable scientific work needs to be undertaken in order to
determine what sources of pollution are having an impact on the downwind state.
The federal government has the technical expertise to make such determinations
because they are quite similar to the determinations that it must make under different
provisions of environmental law-for example, in determining whether emissions
limitations in a SIP lead to the attainment of the NAAQS in that state. This type of
expertise would be costly for states to replicate in connection with their negotiations
over compacts.
121 See
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number of sources is fixed. Section B examines the situation in
which the downwind state's ambient air-quality levels are better than
the federal ambient standards.
A. Dealing with Violations of the Ambient Standard
in the Downwind State
The design of a scheme to control interstate externalities must
consider the manner in which pollution from an upwind state affects
environmental quality in the downwind state. The impact that
upwind pollution has on a downwind state's air quality is the product
124
of three principal factors: emissions, location and stack height.
For a given stack height and location, the source's impact on
ambient air quality increases with increasing levels of emissions. For
a given stack height and level of emissions, the source's impact on
ambient air quality in the downwind state increases as the distance
between the source and the border with the downwind state
decreases. For a given location and level of emissions, as stack height
increases, the source has a smaller impact on ambient air quality
within short distances and a greater impact on ambient air quality
farther away.
The first subsection deals with the situation in which the sources'
location and stack height have been fixed and asks how emissions
should be allocated between upwind and downwind sources-the
only inquiry performed by the EPA and the courts. In subsequent
subsections, these assumptions are relaxed. In all of these instances,
the objective is to minimize the aggregate cost of meeting the
125
ambient standard.
1. Selecting Desirable Levels of Emissions Where the Location
and Stack Heights of Firms Are Fixed
The problem of allocating pollution-control burdens between
upwind and downwind states to minimize the aggregate cost of
meeting a given level of environmental quality is illustrated through
a simple example in which there are only two sources: one, which I
shall call U, in the upwind state and the other, which I shall call D,
in the downwind state. The level of emissions of these sources is e.
124For water pollution, only effluent levels-the analog of emissions-and location
are relevant.
125See supra text accompanying notes 120-22 (discussing the relationship between
welfare maximization and cost minimization).
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and ed, respectively. The impact of these emissions on ambient air
quality is denoted by a, and ad, respectively. A simple relationship
between a source's emissions and the impact of those emissions on
ambient air quality at various distances downwind from the source is
assumed: the impact increases linearly with distance up to a certain
distance, m, downwind from the source and then begins to decrease
linearly as the distance from the source continues to increase. The
emissions have no impact upwind from the source and the downwind
impacts occur along a single line. The distance between the two
sources is t.
In both the upwind and downwind states, the ambient standard
is set at a level s. Thus, in any given place, the sum of the impact of
the two sources on ambient air-quality levels cannot exceed this level.
As indicated, the objective is to minimize the total cost of
meeting the ambient standard, which is the sum of the pollutioncontrol costs, c. and cd, borne by the upwind and downwind sources,
respectively. For each source, this cost is a function of the levels of emissions, e. and ed. The cost rises as the level of emissions falls because the source needs to make more expenditures in pollution
control. Moreover, the lower the level of emissions, the higher the
increase in costs for an additional unit of emissions reduction. This
assumption, which is standard, reflects the fact that a source will first
reduce its emissions by the cheapest method, resorting to more
expensive methods only when the cheaper reductions have been
exhausted. So, for example, an electric utility might be able to
achieve a moderate level of emissions reductions by the relatively
inexpensive technique of washing its coal, but to achieve larger
reductions it will have to utilize the far more expensive technique of
installing stack scrubbers.
There are three different situations, which are defined by the
distance between the upwind and downwind sources. In the first
situation, at the point at which the upwind source has its maximum
impact (at a distance m from this source), the downwind source has
an impact as well. In the second situation, the downwind source has
no impact at the point at which the upwind source has its maximum
impact, but both sources have an impact farther downwind. In the
third situation, there is no point at which both sources have an
impact.
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The analysis that follows focuses on the first situation, because it
is the most complex.'2 6 Figure I illustrates this situation: the
upwind source has its maximum impact at point m, and at that point
the downwind source also has an impact. The extent of the impact
from both sources can be broken down into five regions, defined by
the distance from the upwind source.
First, for distances of less than t from the upwind source, the only
impact on ambient air quality comes from the upwind source, and it
increases with increasing distance. Second, for distances between t
and m from the upwind source, both sources have an impact on
ambient air quality, and the impact of each source increases with
increasing distance.
Third, for distances between m and m+t from the upwind source,
both sources have an impact on ambient air quality. The impact of
the upwind source decreases as the distance from the source
increases (because distance from the source is greater than m),
whereas the impact from the downwind source increases with
increasing distance (because throughout the relevant range the
distance from the downwind source is less than m). Thus, if the
emissions of the two sources are equal, as is shown in Figure I,
throughout this range the impact on ambient air quality will be
constant. In contrast, if the emissions from the upwind source are
higher, the impact on ambient air quality decreases as the distance
from the sources increases. Conversely, if the emissions from the
downwind source are higher, the impact on ambient air quality
increases as the distance from the sources increases.
In the fourth region, in which the distance from the upwind
source is between m+t and 2m, the impact from each of the sources
decreases as the distance increases. Finally, in the fifth region, in
which the distance from the upwind source is between 2m and 2m+t,
the upwind source no longer has any impact on ambient air-quality

126

The second and third scenarios are discussed briefly in the margin. See infra

note 127.
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FIGURE I: Impacts on Ambient Air-Quality Levels
As a Function of Distance
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levels; in turn, the impact of the downwind source decreases as the
distance increases.
Because the optimization problem analyzed here is constrained
by the requirement that the combined impact of the two sources not
lead to the violation of the federal ambient standards, it is necessary
to determine where the combined emissions have the maximum
impact. If the emissions from the two sources satisfy the ambient
standard at this point, it will follow, afortiori,that they will satisfy the
ambient standard everywhere else. Figure I reveals that the combined impact of the two sources on ambient air-quality levels will be
greater at a distance of m from the upwind source than at any smaller
distance, since in this range the impact of each of the sources
increases as distance increases. Further, the impact will be greater
at a distance of m+t than at any greater distance, since in this range
the impact of each of the sources decreases as distance increases.
Finally, in the range between m and m+t, the combined impact of the
two sources increases with increasing distance if the emissions from
the upwind source are smaller than the emissions from the downwind
source, and decreases with increasing distance if the emissions from
the upwind source are greater than the emissions from the downwind
source.
For example, if the marginal cost of emissions reduction of the
upwind source is sufficiently greater than the marginal cost of
emissions reduction of the downwind source, then the overall cost of
meeting the ambient standard will be minimized if the emissions
from the upwind source are greater than those of the downwind
source. In that case, the maximum combined impact of the two
sources will be at a distance of m from the upwind source. Conversely, if the marginal cost of emissions reduction of the upwind source
is sufficiently smaller than the marginal cost of emissions reduction
of the downwind source, then the overall cost of meeting the
ambient standard will be minimized if the emissions from the upwind
source are smaller than those of the downwind source. Then, the
maximum combined impact of the two sources will be at a distance
m+t from the upwind source.
Thus, one needs to ensure only that the ambient standard is not
violated at two points: at distances from the upwind source of m and
m+t, respectively. If the ambient standard is met at both of these
points, it will be met at all other points as well. One needs to ensure
that the ambient standard is met at both of these points because one
does not know until the problem is solved what the optimal relationship between the emissions of the two sources will be. The ambient
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standard, however, is going to be constraining only at one of these
points (unless the optimal emissions from both sources are identical).
As indicated above, given that the federal ambient standards are
binding, the objective is to minimize the aggregate costs of meeting
those standards. To this point, for expositional convenience, the
analysis has proceeded on the basis of a specific model of the impact
of emissions on ambient air quality. It is easy to show, however, that
the following results hold generally. The cost-minimizing allocation
of the pollution-control burden of meeting a given ambient standard
occurs when, at the point at which the ambient standard is constraining, the ratio of the marginal cost of emissions reduction (the cost
of abating one additional unit of emissions, where such a unit is
infinitesimal) for the upwind source to the marginal cost of emissions
reduction for the downwind source is equal to the ratio of the
marginal impact (the impact of one additional unit of emissions,
where such a unit is infinitesimal) of the upwind source to the
marginal impact of the downwind source on the ambient air-quality
level in the downwind state.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Assume that
when the federal ambient standards in the downwind state are met,
one additional unit of emissions from the upwind source has twice
the impact on the ambient air-quality level in the downwind state as
one additional unit of emissions from the downwind source, and that
the marginal cost of emissions reduction is the same for both
sources. In that case, the aggregate cost of meeting the federal
ambient standards would be lowered if the upwind source were
required to reduce its emissions further and the downwind source
were permitted to increase its emissions. Alternatively, if one
additional unit of emissions from the upwind source has the same
impact on the ambient air-quality level in the downwind state as one
additional unit of emissions from the downwind source, and the
marginal cost of emissions reduction is twice as high for the upwind
source, then the aggregate cost of meeting the federal ambient
standards would be lowered if the downwind source were required to
reduce its emissions further, and the upwind source were permitted
to increase its emissions. It is only when the two ratios are equal that
the aggregate costs of meeting the federal ambient standards cannot
be reduced by reallocating the emissions reduction requirements.
This result differs in an important respect from the well-known
result of how to minimize the costs of achieving an aggregate level
of emissions. In the latter case, the costs are minimized when the
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marginal costs of emissions reduction are equal for all the sources.
Otherwise the aggregate costs would be reduced by imposing more
stringent controls on the source with the lower marginal costs and
less stringent controls on the source with the higher marginal costs.
Where, instead, the goal is not to minimize the cost of meeting an
aggregate level of emissions, but rather to minimize the cost of
meeting an ambient standard, the solution takes the more complex
127
form described above.
The preceding discussion illuminates how to deal with situations
in which there is a violation of the ambient standard in the downwind state and where both the upwind and the downwind sources are
contributing to the violation. To summarize, the following steps
need to be undertaken by a decisionmaker interested in minimizing
the aggregate costs of meeting the ambient standard in the downwind state.
First, at a point at which there is a violation, the decisionmaker
would determine the impact of one unit of emissions from each of
the sources and calculate their ratio. Second, it would determine the
marginal costs of emissions reduction for each of the firms and
calculate their ratio. Third, it would determine at what levels of
emissions these ratios are equal; at these levels, the pollution- control
burden is allocated optimally. Fourth, it would ascertain whether the
upwind source is polluting more than this amount and, if so, would
order it to reduce its emissions accordingly.
If, in contrast, the upwind source was polluting less than this
optimal amount, the decisionmaker would simply deny the downwind
state's petition, and all the reductions would have to come from the
downwind state. From the perspective of social welfare, too little
pollution from the upwind source can be as undesirable as too much
pollution, because it permits the downwind source to emit a
suboptimally large amount of pollution without violating the ambient
standard. Nonetheless, the reason for federal intervention-the
concern about interstate externalities-is implicated only if the
upwind pollution is excessive.
" In cases in which t >m, see supra text accompanying notes 125-26, at the point
at which each source has its maximum impact on ambient air quality, the other source
has no impact at all. If the ambient standard is met at the point at which each source
has its maximum impact, it follows that it will be met everywhere else as well. Thus,
the permissible level of emissions from each source is independent of the cost of
achieving the emissions reductions: it is simply the level necessary to meet the
ambient standard. The solution is simply e, = ed = s/m, and is independent, for both
sources, of the costs of pollution abatement.
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The work of the decisionmaker, however, does not end here.
The fact that it was able to calculate the optimal allocation of the
pollution-control burden at a particular point does not mean that the
corresponding levels of emissions will lead to the achievement of the
ambient standard everywhere else.
Even if the basis for this
calculation was the point where the ambient standard was violated by
the largest amount, it may well be that the optimal level of emissions,
from the perspective of minimizing the costs of meeting the ambient
standard at that point, might nonetheless lead to violations elsewhere. The decisionmaker would then have to determine what
additional reductions would need to be made, and in what proportion, so that the ambient standard was met everywhere.
A rule of thumb for how to carry out this process might be to
start at the point of maximum violation and determine the optimal
adjustment to emissions of the upwind and downwind sources
consistent with meeting the ambient standard there. Next, one
would check whether these adjusted levels of emissions lead to
violations elsewhere. If so, one would focus on the point at which
the adjusted levels of emissions produced the largest violation and
determine, once again, the optimal adjustments. This process would
be repeated until there were no further violations.
The inquiry becomes more complicated when there are multiple
sources in the upwind and downwind states. The ratios of marginal
costs of emissions reductions would have to be set equal to the ratio
of the impacts of one unit of emissions for each pair of sources. Any
upwind source that had emissions that were excessive under this
standard would be ordered to reduce them. Here, too, the decisionmaker would have to perform the iterations described above to
ensure that the ambient standard was met at every point.
The preceding inquiry exposes fundamental misconceptions in
the administrative and judicial approaches to the problem of
interstate pollution. First, it is not desirable to bar all upwind
pollution from reaching the downwind state, as the legal regime
purports to do in cases in which the upwind pollution is the but-for
cause of the violation in the downwind state.12 8 Because of prevailing winds, for a given location and stack height, it may be inevitable
that emissions from the upwind state will have some impact on
ambient air quality in the downwind state. 29 To prohibit any such
128 See

supra text accompanying notes 116-18.

" See Ostrov, supra note 75, at 83.
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impact is tantamount to prohibiting industrial activity in those
locations.
Second, the appropriate test is not dependent on which source
is polluting more, whether in the aggregate or per unit of input into
or output from the production process. Indeed, it is desirable for
the upwind source to pollute more if its marginal cost of emissions
reduction is sufficiently higher, or if one unit of its emissions has a
sufficiently smaller impact than that of the downwind source at the
point in the downwind state where the ambient standard is constraining.
Third, as already indicated, the well-known condition that cost
minimization requires that the marginal costs of emissions reductions
be equal for all sources does not hold where the objective is to
minimize the aggregate cost of meeting a given ambient standard
rather than to minimize the aggregate cost of reducing the total level
of emissions to a given level.
Fourth, it is inappropriate to rest the analysis solely on a
comparison of which source has the larger impact on ambient airquality levels in the downwind state. Given the location, stack height
and marginal cost of emissions reduction of the upwind source, the
cost-minimizing solution might be for that source to have a larger
impact.
Fifth, the prevailing judicial standard, under which upwind
emissions are enjoined only if they significantly contribute to the
violation of the ambient standard in the downwind state, is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because there
will be instances in which, as a result of the location, stack height
and marginal costs of emissions reduction of the upwind source, it
will be socially desirable for that source to have a large impact on
ambient air quality downwind.'
The standard is underinclusive
because, even if the contribution of the upwind source to a violation
is small, the aggregate cost of meeting the ambient standard in the
downwind state might be reduced by imposing more stringent
controls on the upwind source.
To this point, the analysis has been static. It has assumed that
the number of sources is fixed and has asked how the pollutioncontrol burden among these sources should be allocated to minimize
costs. Significant complications arise when the problem is viewed
' Of course, if these factors are taken into account in determining which
contributions are significant, this problem does not arise.
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dynamically, so that, over time, additional sources choose to locate
in the upwind and downwind states. Neither the EPA nor the courts
have addressed these complications.
The addition of a new source can be the but-for cause of a
violation of the ambient standards. This violation would trigger the
need to recalculate the optimal contributions of upwind and
downwind sources by equating the ratios of marginal costs in the
manner explained above.
Two features concerning the costs of emissions reduction suggest
that it is likely to be considerably cheaper for a new source to meet
a given level of emissions reduction than for an existing source to do
so. First, new sources tend to install the technology that is optimal
for the level of emissions reduction that they are required to meet
and anticipate having to meet during the life of the technology. For
example, if the standard prevailing when a source installs its
technology requires emissions reductions of fifty percent (as
compared with the level of uncontrolled emissions), the source is
likely to choose the technology that works optimally at that level.
While it may be technologically feasible to push that technologyto
meet a reduction requirement of sixty percent, the costs of doing so
are likely to be higher than the costs a new source would incur in
installing a technology chosen specifically to meet the sixty-percent
requirement.
Second, an existing source might need to change its pollutioncontrol technology altogether in order to meet a more stringent
standard. For example, the technology used to reduce emissions by
fifty percent might simply not be suitable to reduce emissions by
ninety percent. If so, the source's investment in the original
pollution-control technology would be worthless, and new technology
would have to be purchased to meet the more stringent standard."'
Because of the nature of these cost functions, if, for example, the
ambient air quality in the downwind state is degraded by upwind
sources all the way to the level of the federal ambient standards, and
"I,For discussion of these features of control costs, see, e.g., Robert W. Crandall,
The Political Economy of Clean Air: Practical Constraints on White House Review, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER: THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-

COST ANALYSIS 205, 212-13 (V. Kerry Smith ed., 1984); Matthew D. McCubbins et al.,

Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 467 (1989); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation,

Innovation, and AdministrativeLaw: A ConceptualFramework,69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1270
(1981).
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the downwind state then attracts new sources, the cost-minimizing
solution has the following properties: it would call for tightening the
emissions reduction requirements for the existing sources in order
to accommodate the new growth, while demanding even more
stringent emissions reductions requirements for the new sources than
for the existing sources.
Although this approach will minimize the costs of meeting the
federal ambient standards, given the nature of the existing sources,
it will not minimize the aggregate costs over time of meeting the
federal ambient standards. Instead, it would be less costly overall for
the existing sources to be subjected initially to more stringent
standards, thus "reserving" a margin for growth to be consumed by
the sources that the state now wants to attract.
If the sources affecting ambient air quality in the downwind state
were all located in that state, the decision to "reserve" such a margin
for growth would be quite straightforward because such ajurisdiction
would capture the cost savings that result from its actions. The
situation is more complex when sources in an upwind state affect
ambient air-quality levels in the downwind state. In that case, both
states would have to agree on the likely levels of future economic
growth in each state, and on how to divide the costs of future
pollution.
If both states were a single jurisdiction, one would not worry
about a decision to "reserve" a particular area for future economic
growth. Unlike the downwind state, such a jurisdiction would not
face the structural bias that arises when the costs of preserving a
margin for growth are externalized outside its borders.
The problem of allocating economic growth could be addressed
through a regional planning authority, or through planning by the
federal government. Neither outcome, however, is likely to work
well. Because regional planning authorities are formed by representatives of the various affected states, relying on such a mechanism
implies confidence in the ability of the states to take care of the
problem of interstate externalities absent outside intervention. In
seeking to justify the presence of federal regulation to address the
problem of interstate externalities, one is assuming that, left to
their own devices, states will not be able to solve the problem
well.

13 2

As an alternative, a federal planning process could take place
12 See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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when the downwind state complained about the upwind pollution by
challenging the proposed permit of an upwind source. In theory,
the inquiry could focus on the likelihood that each state would face
a demand for industrial location in the future. The factors at stake,
however, are too speculative and manipulable for the federal inquiry
to have much credibility. A possible solution is explored in Part IV.
2. Role of Stack Height
To this point, the analysis has proceeded on the assumption that
the stack heights of sources are fixed. This assumption might hold
if there were a "correct" height for each stack, determined solely by
reference to engineering criteria. But as indicated in Part I, the
engineering criteria do not establish a "correct" height. 3 ' While
the regulations provide some constraints, they leave substantial room
for discretion on the part of a source."' This section relaxes the
assumption of fixed stack heights and determines both the optimal
levels of emissions and the optimal stack heights for upwind and
downwind sources.
For this purpose, the problem needs to be modified in some
minor ways. First, the pollution-control costs, c, and cd, are now a
function of both the level of emissions, e, and ed, and the stack
heights, h. and hd. For a given level of emissions, higher stacks imply
higher control costs. Moreover, the higher the stack, the greater the
cost of an additional unit of stack height.'
Second, the impact of a source's emissions on ambient air-quality
levels depends on the height of the stack. Higher stacks imply
smaller impacts on ambient air quality closer to the source and
greater impacts farther from the source.'
131 See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
' See supra text accompanying notes 43-54.
' One manufacturer estimates that a 1000-foot stack costs more than three times
as much as a 500-foot stack, in part because of the need to have a stronger base to
support the larger structure. See The Building of Tall (and Not So Tall) Stacks, ENVTL.
Sci. & TECH., June 1975, at 522, 525 [hereinafter Tall (and Not So Tall) Stacks]. For

estimates of the costs of building tall stacks, see Senate Comm. on Public Works, supra
note 36, at 516-17, 527; Tall (andNot So Tall) Stacks, supra,at 525.
1-' SeeWILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 219-25. Another complication arises because
the impact of emissions on downwind ambient air quality depends not only on stack
height but also on plume rise. If the emissions are warm when they leave the stack,
they will continue to rise as a result of their buoyancy. In addition, the emissions can
be induced to rise by means of fans-a common technique in the case of large steamgenerating electrical power plants. The effective height of a stack is therefore equal
to its physical height plus the amount of plume rise. See id. at 226-27. The
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The cost-minimizing solution to this problem requires that four
conditions be satisfied at the point at which the federal ambient
standards are constraining. First, as in the case where the level of
emissions reduction was the only decision variable,137 cost minimization requires that the ratio of the cost of an additional unit of
emissions reduction for the upwind source to the cost of an
additional unit of emissions reduction for the downwind source be
equal to the ratio of the impact on downwind ambient air quality of
an additional unit of emissions reduction from the upwind source to
the impact of an additional unit of emissions reduction from the
downwind source." 8
Second, cost minimization requires that the ratio of the cost of
an additional unit of stack height for the upwind source to the cost
of an additional unit of stack height for the downwind source be
equal to the ratio of the impact on downwind ambient air quality of
an additional unit of stack height for the upwind source to the
impact of an additional unit of stack height for the downwind source.
Otherwise, as a result of an argument similar to the one made in the
case of emissions, aggregate costs would be reduced by decreasing
the height of one stack and increasing the height of the other stack.
For example, if, in contrast, one additional unit of stack height
for the upwind source has the same impact on the ambient airquality level in the downwind state as one additional unit of stack
height for the downwind source, but the cost of an additional unit of
stack height is twice as high for the upwind source, the aggregate
cost of meeting the federal ambient standards would be lowered if
the upwind source had a smaller stack and the downwind source had
a taller stack. The additional impact on ambient air quality of the
upwind source would then be mitigated by the decreased impact of
the downwind source. 3 9
In contrast to the first and second conditions, which set forth the
relationships across sources concerning, respectively, emissions levels
and stack heights, the third and fourth conditions define, for each
source, the optimal tradeoffs between emissions and stack height.
regulations prohibit "manipulating" the production process to increase plume rise but
do not specify what counts as manipulation. See40 C.F.R. § 51.100(hh) (1) (iii) (1995).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
"s As in the prior subsection, all units are assumed to be infinitesimal.
139 This example assumes that the distance from both sources to the point at which
their combined emissions produce the largest impact on ambient air-quality levels is
such that for each source, a taller stack decreases the impact on ambient air-quality
levels of one unit of emissions.
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For each source, cost minimization requires that the ratio of the cost
of an additional unit of emissions reduction to the cost of an
additional unit of stack height increase be equal to the ratio of the
impact on ambient air quality of an additional unit of emissions to
the impact of an additional unit of stack height. Otherwise,
aggregate costs could be reduced by intrasource tradeoffs between
emissions and stack height: the aggregate costs of compliance could
be lowered by lower emissions compensating for lower stack height,
or vice versa.
3. Role of Location
This section relaxes the assumption that the location of the
sources is fixed. That assumption would hold if the location of a
source is determined independently of the impact of its emissions on
ambient air-quality levels. But that is not so. Sources can choose
their location, and states have an incentive to favor certain choices
over others.
If a source's environmental effects were confined to a single
jurisdiction, the source could pick the location that was most
convenient for it in light of all the associated costs and benefits, such
as the price of land, access to raw materials, proximity to customers,
and availability of a suitable workforce, as well as costs of meeting the
environmental requirements. For example, one location might be
preferable on nonenvironmental grounds but might have associated
with it higher costs of environmental compliance as a result of its
greater proximity to other sources. Because the firm "sees" all the
associated costs and benefits, it will be able to resolve the tradeoff in
a socially desirable way. The only action required on the part of the
state to produce this socially desirable outcome is for it to have a
credible environmental enforcement scheme (or, alternatively, for
there to be a credible federal enforcement scheme).
The situation is different when there are interjurisdictional
externalities. Then, the state in which the firm wishes to locate has
no incentive to worry about the interjurisdictional effects of the
firm's pollution, and in fact will favor environmental and regulatory
externalization. 40 Similarly, absent an interstate mechanism
designed to control interjurisdictional spillovers, the firm's tradeoff
will be skewed. It will take into account all the nonenvironmental
140 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 (discussing these two types of
externalization).
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costs and benefits of competing locations, but will consider only the
environmental compliance cost over which the state in which it
locates has a regulatory interest.
Thus, unless there is a well-functioning scheme for controlling
interjurisdictional pollution, the presence of interstate borders will
affect the location of sources in a way that reduces social welfare.
Specifically, other things being equal, a state will benefit if its sources
locate as far downwind as possible, so that the state can capture the
source's benefits in terms ofjobs and taxes without suffering the full
environmental and regulatory costs. Similarly, the source will benefit
from less stringent environmental requirements.
When a source from an upwind state applies for a permit, the
inquiry concerning the permissibility of the interstate impact must
consider whether the proposed location of the source was affected by
the presence of the border. If so, the source should be required to
locate in the place where it would have located if its emissions had
affected only one jurisdiction. Absent such an inquiry, the source,
as a result of its suboptimal location, will have too large an impact on
ambient air quality in the downwind state.
Thus, to solve the optimization problem, one needs to determine
not only the optimal emissions limitations and stack heights for the
upwind and downwind sources, but also the optimal locations of
these sources. To perform this inquiry one needs to know the effect
of location both on the impact of a source's emissions on ambient
air-quality levels and on the interactions between the emissions of
upwind and downwind sources.
Once again, at the point at which the ambient standard in the
downwind state is constraining, several conditions must be satisfied.
As before, the ratio of the cost of an additional unit of emissions
reduction from the upwind source to the cost of an additional unit
of emissions reduction from the downwind source must be equal to
the ratio of the impact on downwind ambient air quality of an
additional unit of emissions from the upwind source to the impact of
an additional unit of emissions reduction from the downwind source.
Also, the ratio of the cost of an additional unit of stack height for
the upwind source to the cost of an additional unit of stack height
for the downwind source must be equal to the ratio of the impact on
downwind ambient air quality of an additional unit of stack height
from the upwind source to the impact of an additional unit of stack
height from the downwind source.
A similar condition applies to location: the ratio of the cost of
one additional unit of departure from the location that would have
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been preferred absent environmental regulation for the upwind
source to the cost of a similar locational movement for the downwind
source must be equal to the ratio of the impacts of such departures
141
on downwind ambient air quality.
It might appear at first glance that only the upwind source would
be motivated by the desire to externalize the effects of pollution to
other states. But the downwind source can externalize costs as well,
by locating in a place in which the effects of its emissions on ambient
air-quality levels result in the need for the upwind source to
undertake greater emissions reductions. In a single jurisdiction, a
regulator would have an incentive to take this possibility into account
in approving permits. In contrast, when two separate jurisdictions
are involved, absent a regime for controlling spillovers, the downwind
source would not pay attention to the impact of its locational choice
on the pollution reduction costs of the upwind source.
This discussion underscores the difference between the static and
dynamic considerations of the permissibility of interstate impacts.
Once a source has been located, the cost of requiring it to relocate
is likely to be prohibitive. As a result, the order in which sources
locate matters a great deal. For example, one source might be fairly
indifferent between two possible locations. If it chooses the location
that is preferable, though only by a small margin, it might foreclose
a later source from locating there even though, for that source, the
location would have been preferable by a far larger margin. In a
single jurisdiction, this problem might be taken care of through the
planning process, where different sites could be reserved for
predicted economic growth of different types. When there are
interjurisdictional consequences, the coordination problems between
the two jurisdictions are far more complex.142 Absent such ex ante
planning, the ex post remedies available in actions brought by the
downwind states against the upwind pollution will not lead to siting
decisions that reduce the aggregate cost of pollution control over
time.

141 In addition, for each source there will be three intrasource conditions,
concerning the relationships among emissions, stack height and location. See supra
text accompanying notes 138-40.
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B. Dealing with Instances in Which the Ambient Standard
in the Downwind State Is Not Violated
A wholly different set of issues is present in cases in which the
downwind state meets the federal ambient standards but nonetheless
would like to limit upwind pollution. There are two distinct
scenarios. First, the downwind state might have a state ambient
standard that is more stringent than the federal standard, and this
standard might be violated as a result of the combined impact of the
in-state and upwind pollution. Under section 116 of the Clean Air
Act, states can set more stringent standards.1 43 The statute, however, says nothing about whether a state can then invoke this more
stringent standard in order to enjoin upwind pollution.
Second, the downwind state might wish to reserve a margin for
economic growth in order to attract new industry in the future.
Under this scenario, industry might not be currently interested in
locating in the state. The state will believe, however, that economic
conditions might change in the future and might want to ensure that
when this happens, its margin for growth will not have been
consumed by pollution coming from the upwind state. 44
In each of these scenarios, the EPA and the courts have ruled
against the downwind state, finding that in the absence of an actual
violation of the federal ambient standards, the upwind pollution
should not be enjoined. 45 These decisions reflect a misunderstanding of the issues implicated by the control of interstate
externalities.
The first scenario lends itself to the most straightforward analysis.
The downwind state's attempt to invoke its more stringent state
ambient standards against the upwind source might reflect an effort
to externalize the costs of better environmental quality. Alternatively, it could be a policy that would have been undertaken even if the
state had taken into account all the costs imposed outside its borders.

See Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994).
A similar situation arises in instances in which the downwind state might wish
to attract new industry immediately, but might be unable to do so because it is in
violation of the ambient standards for another pollutant. For example, sources that
emit sulfur dioxide typically also emit particulates. Thus, for example, if a state is a
nonattainment area for particulates, it would not be able to use its margin for growth
with respect to sulfur dioxide. The question, then, is whether the upwind state should
be allowed to consume this margin for growth without constraint.
" See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
'4
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To address this scenario, one should first ask: if the upwind state
and downwind state had been a single jurisdiction, would a decisionmaker interested in maximizing aggregate social welfare have
adopted the more stringent ambient standard in the downwind state?
Such a decision would be made if the preferences in the downwind
state for more stringent environmental standards are such that the
resulting net benefits to the downwind state outweigh the costs
imposed on polluters in the upwind state. If that is the case, it
should not matter that part of the costs are borne by the upwind
state.
This inquiry reveals whether the more stringent state ambient
standard is permissible. A state ambient standard that does not meet
this test should not be the predicate for any action to enjoin upwind
pollution, and any attempt by the downwind state to limit such
pollution should rest exclusively on the federal ambient standards.
If, in contrast, the state ambient standard survives scrutiny, the
second step involves determining when upwind pollution that violates
such a standard is impermissible. The inquiry described in the
previous subsections would then be performed, treating the more
stringent state ambient standard as if it were the relevant ambient
standard.
In the second scenario, the downwind state wishes to preserve its
margin for growth in order to attract industry in the future. At first
glance, it might appear that the state could adequately protect this
margin for growth by relaxing the emissions limitations on its
existing sources until the ambient standard is constraining. In the
event of a later violation caused by upwind pollution, under the
misguided approach followed by the EPA and the courts, 146 the
downwind state could move to enjoin such pollution on the ground
that it is the but-for cause of the violation. Subsequently, when new
sources were ready to move in, the state could strengthen the
emissions limitations on its existing sources.
Such a strategy is quite problematic. From the perspective of cost
minimization, what matters is whether the marginal costs of emissions
reduction among the sources have the correct relationships, not
which source's pollution placed the emissions in the downwind state
over the level of the ambient standards. The latter approach,
moreover, creates undesirable incentives for states to offer their
14

See supratext accompanying notes 98-105.
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sources suboptimally lax standards in order to capture the margin for
growth before the other state consumes it.
Alternatively, one could let the upwind state consume the margin
for growth during the period in which there is no demand for
industrial location in the downwind state. Subsequently, when
economic conditions in the downwind state changed, the downwind
state could move to limit the upwind pollution. This strategy is
problematic as well. As already indicated, it generally is cheaper to
build a polluting facility designed to meet a stringent emissions
standard than to build it with a less stringent standard in mind and,
subsequently, require it to meet a more stringent standard.' 47 It is
true that the upwind sources might predict what the calculus would
look like once the downwind state was able to attract new sources,
but such an inquiry would be highly speculative.
Thus, neither of the polar solutions is desirable. Instead, it
would be preferable to predict at the outset the future rate and
location of economic growth. As discussed above, however, neither
an interstate nor a federal planning process is likely to work well.1 48
A possible solution is explored in Part IV.
III. INTERSTATE EXTERNALITIES AND THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Part II defined a set of standards for dealing with interstate
externalities that was premised on the maximization of social welfare
in light of the requirements of the federal ambient standards. This
objective leads to far stronger constraints on interstate externalities
than those enforced, to date, by the EPA and the courts.
This Part argues that the standards of the Dormant Commerce
Clause are relevant to the interpretation of federal regulatory
provisions designed to address the problem of interstate externalities
(such as sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b) of the Clean Air Act) and
that these standards justify controls on interstate externalities at least
14 9
as rigorous as those that emerged from the discussion in Part II.

See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
49 For recent discussions of these standards in the context of environmental and
health-and-safety protections, see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade
and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1401, 1412-14 (1994); Stewart, International supra note 3, at 1332.
147
148
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A. Analogy to the Dormant Commerce Clause

In order to shield itself from the health-and-safety consequences
of out-of-state products or wastes, or to preserve for its citizens a
scarce natural resource, a state can constrain the importation of the
product or waste, or the exportation of the natural resource. In such
cases, the standards of the Dormant Commerce Clause define the
extent to which the state can impose costs on out-of-state firms or
citizens in order to fulfill the preferences of its own citizens."' 0
In contrast, a state cannot directly stop air or water pollution
from coming across its border. It can, however, seek a federal
injunction against excessive upwind pollution under provisions such
as sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b) of the Clean Air Act. The
federal remedy allows it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
The role of the federal decisionmaker under these provisions is to
determine the extent to which the state's preferences for higher
environmental quality or a larger margin for economic growth should
be respected in light of the costs imposed on out-of-state interests.
Both situations-one in which self-help is available and one in
which it is not-raise the same tradeoffs between in-state and out-ofstate interests. Where states can take direct action, giving an affected
state too much leeway to constrain the importation of a product or
waste or the exportation of a natural resource is undesirable because
it permits the state to externalize the costs of its environmental
preferences or to act in a protectionist manner. The state would
therefore impose more stringent constraints than it would if it had
to bear the costs of its actions. Where states can protect themselves
only indirectly by invoking a federal remedy, an analogous situation
arises if the standards under which affected states can obtain
injunctions are too lax.
Similarly, in cases in which direct action is available to affected
states, giving the state too little leeway to constrain the importation
of a product or the exportation of a natural resource will undervalue
the preferences of the affected state for more stringent health-andsafety or environmental protection and, concomitantly, weigh too
heavily the out-of-state interests at stake. Here, too, an analogous
situation arises where affected states can protect themselves only
indirectly by invoking a federal remedy. If the standards under
which they can obtain injunctions are too stringent, out-of-state
'- See Michael E. Smith, StateDiscriminationsAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1203, 1220-22 (1986).
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interests will be unduly privileged. Thus, the interests at stake in the
control of interstate environmental externalities are parallel to those
that arise in the context of problems addressed by the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
Admittedly, the situations are different in two important ways. As
already indicated, a state cannot stop air or water pollution at its
border in the way that it can stop the entry of wastes or of products
that violate a state health-and-safety standard.
Moreover, the
presence of federal regulation in the environmental area makes the
Dormant Commerce Clause formally inapplicable: there are simply
no constitutional constraints on how the federal government
allocates among the states the burdens of meeting the federal
ambient standards. These differences, however, do not detract from
the force of the analogy.
First, the nature of the harm-air or water pollution as opposed
to wastes or dangerous products-should not affect how the burdens
of regulating health and safety or the environment are allocated
between source states and affected states. If a particular distribution
of this burden is appropriate for wastes or dangerous products, there
is no compelling reason why a different allocation should be
preferable for air or water pollution.
Second, the standards of the Dormant Commerce Clause flow
from a vision about the appropriate relationships among states in our
federal system.''
They reflect our nation's attempt to define
constraints, in the absence of congressional action, on the ability of
151 The Framers granted Congress plenary authority over interstate
commerce in "the conviction that in order to succeed, the new
Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation." "This
principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has
the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy ... has as
its corollary that the states are not separable economic units."
Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (1994)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). The multiplicity of approaches taken in
the jurisprudence of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see infra text accompanying
notes 195-97, does not detract from the force of the claim that this provision
embodies an important structural principle concerning the permissible relationship
among the states in our federal system. For academic commentary concerning the
Dormant Commerce Clause, see generally Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1091 (1986); Smith, supra note 150; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125 (1979).
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both source states and affected states to externalize the impacts of
their policies. As a result, these standards ought to govern the
interpretation of federal provisions designed to combat interstate
externalities, such as sections 110(a) (2) (D) and 126(b) of the Clean
Air Act, unless Congress has explicitly mandated a different tradeoff
between the interests of upwind and downwind states. Thus, even
though the Dormant Commerce Clause is not formally applicable in
the presence of federal regulation,1 2 its standards should define a
canon of construction for the interpretation of federal statutes
designed to constrain interstate externalities.'5 3
The Dormant Commerce Clause has a peculiar status as a
constitutional provision that can be displaced by federal statutory or
regulatory enactments. Indeed, when this provision applies as a
matter of constitutional principle, it can be displaced by any
applicable federal statutory or regulatory pronouncement. The view
1 2 Congress may authorize the states to engage in regulation that the Dormant
Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138
(1986); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
"I This conclusion follows even if at least some of the standards developed by the
Supreme Court under the Dormant Commerce Clause are viewed as underenforced
constitutional norms-norms which the Court has not enforced to their full
conceptual boundaries as a result of institutional concerns. See Lawrence G. Sager,
FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1213 (1978). For example, one might believe that courts are not institutionally
well suited to balance the interests of the state imposing the restriction subject to the
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge against the interests of other states, as is
contemplated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-46 (1970), and that the
nondiscrimination test, see infra text accompanying notes 195-96, is merely an
underenforced norm, adopted because of its ease of application. Because the courts
would make determinations about permissible upwind pollution, the same institutional
issues arise for the analogy presented here.
The use of such a canon of statutory construction is not necessarily inconsistent
with the requirement of Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), that courts uphold an agency's construction of a statute that
it is entitled to administer unless it is unreasonable or inconsistent with the clear
intent of Congress. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924-25 (D.C. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 970 (1992); Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburgh, 868 E2d 1285, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1989), affd by an equally divided court, 493
U.S. 38, 39 (1989); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Federal Labor
Relations Auth., 798 E2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Some canons, however, have
been found to be "too thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress has clearly
resolved [an] issue." Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Serv. Corp., 940 F.2d 685,
694 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (expressio unius canon); see also Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan,
915 F.2d 454,457 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (canon that statutes benefiting Native Americans
should be construed liberally in their favor); Michigan Citihensforan Indep. Press, 868
F.2d at 1292 (canon that exemptions from the antitrust laws should be construed
narrowly).
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advocated here, in contrast, is that even in the face of federal action,
the Dormant Commerce Clause retains vitality as a canon of
construction if the federal pronouncement does not contain
standards contrary to those of the clause. In such cases, the
federalism principles embodied in the Dormant Commerce Clause
have not been displaced by Congress.
This broader view of the applicability of the Dormant Commerce
Clause is most compelling in cases in which the federal regime is
designed to enable affected states to seek injunctions against source
states. In such cases, the role of the federal regime in constraining
an affected state's ability to obtain injunctions is most closely
analogous to the role of the Dormant Commerce Clause in constraining such a state's ability to rely on self-help.
For other types of federal regulatory approaches, the argument
is likely to be less straightforward. For example, if the federal statute
authorizes the EPA to address the problem of interstate externalities
through command-and-control regulation, the longstanding practice
of geographic uniformity in the promulgation of federal regulations
might be the basis for a competing canon of construction.
B. Standards Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
There is widespread agreement that doctrinal confusion
surrounds the Dormant Commerce Clause. Thus, rather than
attempt to provide a single answer as to how the Dormant Commerce
Clause standards would allocate the burdens of interstate externalities among upwind and downwind states, this section suggests three
plausible ways in which Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
might address the problem faced by downwind states.154
First, efforts by a downwind state with ambient air-quality levels
that are better than the federal ambient standards to enjoin upwind
pollution in order to preserve a larger margin for economic growth
can be analogized to attempts to reserve landfill capacity for in-state
waste producers. Second, such efforts are also analogous to attempts
to preserve natural resources for the enjoyment of a state's citizens.
Finally, efforts to constrain upwind pollution on the ground that it
violates state ambient standards more stringent than the federal
standards are analogous, though in a somewhat more tenuous
14 The discussion that follows does not assume that the courts would be equally
likely to pick each of these three formulations. See infra note 195.
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fashion, to attempts to ban the importation of products presenting
health-and-safety concerns.
For each of the three alternatives, this section analyzes the
leading Dormant Commerce Clause case and discusses how its
standards would treat the problem of interstate environmental
externalities. Under all three formulations, the resulting constraints
would be at least as stringent as those derived in Part II, where the
objective was the maximization of social welfare subject to certain
federal regulatory constraints.
1. Protecting a Margin for Economic Growth
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,155 the Supreme Court struck
down a New Jersey statute that barred the transportation of certain
solid wastes into the state in order to reserve landfill space for instate wastes. The effect of this policy was to delay the expensive and
56
politically difficult task of searching for additional landfill space.
Similarly, a downwind state with ambient air-quality levels better than
the federal standards has an interest in reserving for in-state sources
the resulting margin for growth.
While there are some differences between the landfill and air
pollution situations, these differences do not detract significantly
from the force of the analogy. First, once a state exhausts its landfill
capacity, it can build another landfill. 15 7 In contrast, in the case of
air pollution, the margin for growth is finite. Once it is consumed,
there is no further permissible deterioration. Nonetheless, the state
can create room for additional growth by imposing more stringent
controls on its existing sources. Therefore, in both cases, the
consumption by out-of-state sources of resources in the affected state
creates pressure for the latter to develop more costly resourcesadditional landfill capacity in one case and a margin for additional
air pollution in the other.
Second, in the landfill situation, the margin for economic growth
is created by the investment decisions of the affected state (or of
private firms in the affected state), which expended resources to
construct a landfill even though it was not compelled to do so. In
contrast, in the air pollution case, the margin for growth is defined
by the federal regulatory standards: in the absence of such stan155 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
16 See id. at 625.
157Of course, at

some point a state could exhaust the land suitable for landfills.
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dards, there would be no external constraints on a state's ambient
air-quality levels. Nonetheless, the size of the margin for growth is
still dependent on the decisions of the affected state: the more
stringent the emissions standards that the affected state imposes on
its existing sources, the greater its ability to attract other sources in
the future, provided that upwind sources do not consume the
resource first.
City ofPhiladelphiav. New Jersey and the line of cases that followed
it"' establish the proposition that a state may not discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state sources of solid wastes. The host
state cannot constrain the flow of out-of-state wastes more than the
flow of in-state wastes.' 59 Nor can it charge fees for the disposal of
out-of-state wastes that are greater than those charged for in-state
wastes. 6 ' The case clearly establishes, however, that the host state
can impose flow controls in the form of direct restrictions, taxes or
16 1
charges that do not discriminate against out-of-staters.
In contrast, as discussed above, the federal environmental statutes
have been far less protective of the interests of the downwind states.
As applied by the EPA and the courts, these statutes have allowed
upwind states to consume with impunity the margin for growth in the
downwind states.

158See Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994);

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992). For a
recent analysis of these cases, see Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in
Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, EnvironmentalProtection, and State Autonomy,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1495-1500 (1995); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution,
1995 Sup. Cr. REv. 217, 223-34.
9 See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367 ("Michigan could. . . limit the amount of waste
that landfill operators may accept each year."); City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626
("[I]t may be assumed.., that NewJersey may... slow[] the flow of all waste into
the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be
affected.").
160 See Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1351-53; Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S.
at 343-46.
'0' See sources cited supra notes 159-60 (citing cases establishing the nondiscrimination test). Restrictions on the out-flow of wastes from a state are subject to the
same analysis as restrictions on the in-flow of wastes. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town
of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681-84 (1994).
In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld a Maine
statute banning the importation of live baitfish on the basis of factual findings that
such foreign baitfish would introduce parasites into Maine waters, and that they would
be commingled with normative fish species, potentially causing ecological damage.
See id. at 140-43, 151-52. In contrast, in City of Philadelphia,the foreign waste was no
more harmful than the domestic waste. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
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Attention to the analogy developed here would have led the EPA
and the courts to allocate differently the burdens between upwind
and downwind states. One way to understand how such an allocation
could be performed is by reference to the effects of a hypothetical
tax on units of environmental degradation in the downwind state
levied on the sources in both the upwind and downwind states
responsible for such degradation. Under the reasoning of City of
Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the tax could not be proportional to the
number of units of emissions because the impact of emissions on
environmental degradation is a function of several factors, including
the location of the source.1 62 Indeed, one unit of emissions in the
upwind state might have a lesser effect on downwind ambient airqudlity levels than one unit of emissions in the downwind state, and
a uniform tax on emissions would therefore be likely to fail the
nondiscrimination requirements of City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.163 Making the tax proportional to the source's contribution
to environmental degradation in the downwind state corrects this
problem.
Under such a scheme, the downwind state could control the rate
of its margin for growth through the choice of the
degradation
of
hypothetical tax. The higher the tax, of course, the more such
degradation would be restricted. The downwind state could choose
any hypothetical tax that it wanted, in the same way that City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey does not constrain a state's choice of
nondiscriminatory disposal fees.
For each source in an upwind state that affected the ambient airquality levels of the downwind state, the EPA would determine the
level of emissions that would result if the source actually faced the
hypothetical tax."M If the source's actual emissions were higher
than this level, the excess emissions would potentially be subject to
an injunction.
To obtain such an injunction, however, the downwind state would
have to satisfy the nondiscrimination requirement of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. To satisfy this burden, the downwind state would
need to show that none of its in-state sources were emitting more
than they would have emitted if they had faced the hypothetical tax.
If any of the downwind sources emitted at a higher level, the upwind
See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
163 The reverse might also be true.
11 For discussion of the limitations of models to estimate the impact of emissions
on ambient air-quality levels, see supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
162

2402 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 2341

sources would not be enjoined unless the downwind state promptly
1 65
corrected the problem.
The downwind state would never invoke a hypothetical tax so low
that it would lead to violations of the federal ambient standards.
Such a low tax would compromise the downwind state's ability to
obtain injunctions against upwind pollution, and, in light of its
obligation to comply with the federal ambient standards, would
increase the burden on its own sources. Neither, however, would the
downwind state invoke an excessively high hypothetical tax, because
it would fail to obtain an injunction against upwind pollution if its
own sources were polluting at levels higher than those that would be
induced by such a tax.
In a static world, with no entry of new firms into pollutiongenerating activities or expansion in the demand for the products
manufactured by the existing firms, the pattern of emissions
reductions produced through the device of the hypothetical tax
would lead to the least costly way of attaining whatever ambient airquality levels are induced by the tax. Recall from Part II that a given
ambient air-quality level is met at least cost when the ratio of the
costs of one additional unit of emissions reductions to upwind and
downwind sources, respectively, is the same as the ratio of the
impacts of one additional unit of emissions from these sources on
ambient air-quality levels in the downwind state. 166 A tax on units
of environmental degradation would accomplish this goal. For
example, if the impact on downwind ambient air quality caused by
the downwind source is twice that of the upwind source, the tax
levied on an additional unit of emissions would be twice as high for
the downwind source. Furthermore, because under a tax system a
source will reduce its pollution up to the point at which the cost of
an additional unit of emissions reduction is equal to the tax levied on
each unit of emissions, for the downwind source the cost of an
additional unit of emissions reduction would also be twice as high as
for the upwind source.
Unless the hypothetical tax levels are periodically raised,
economic growth would lead to a worsening of the downwind
" The purpose of this discussion is to explain the broad outlines of an alternative
means of controlling interstate externalities, rather than to deal with the details of
implementation. Thus, it is not necessary to discuss here whether small sources
should be exempted from the inquiry or how the burdens of producing the necessary
information should be allocated.
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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ambient air-quality levels. As already indicated, the downwind state
could encourage or slow down such growth by raising or lowering the
tax levied on units of environmental degradation, in the same way
that a state hosting a landfill can, consistent with City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey and its progeny, affect the rate at which the landfill is
filled by varying the disposal fee.1 67 Regardless of the ambient airquality level in the downwind state, the pollution- control burden
would be allocated between upwind and downwind sources in a
manner that minimized the aggregate costs of pollution abatement.
It is fairly straightforward to compare this approach to constraining interstate externalities with the approach of Part II, which
concerned itself with maximizing social welfare subject to the
requirement that the federal ambient standards be met. In the case
in which the downwind state's hypothetical tax is sufficiently low that
its air quality is degraded right up to the level of the federal ambient
standards, both approaches produce identical results: the resulting
burdens among upwind and downwind sources are allocated in the
manner that minimizes the aggregate costs of compliance.
The standards derived in Part II, however, did not comprehensively regulate the manner in which the margin for growth in the
downwind state would be consumed: they ensured only that such
degradation take place in a manner that did not increase the
ultimate cost of meeting the federal ambient standards. 6
In
contrast, attention to the nondiscrimination standards of the
Dormant Commerce Clause gives the downwind state full leeway to
decide at what rate to degrade its margin for growth and allows it to
constrain upwind pollution even when the federal ambient standards
are not yet binding and even when such constraints on upwind
pollution are not necessary to minimize the ultimate costs of meeting
the ambient standards.
In summary, reliance on the nondiscrimination principles of the
Dormant Commerce Clause permits more extensive controls on
upwind pollution than the controls justified by the goal of maximizing social welfare.' 69 The reason is that the nondiscrimination
principles give the downwind state full decisionmaking authority over
the rate at which the degradation of its ambient air quality occurs,
See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
See supra Part ll.B.
169 This Article does not consider the independent question whether the rule of
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey provides the optimal incentives for investment in
landfill facilities.
167

168
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even in cases in which the downwind state would not retard growth
to the same extent if it were required to bear the costs imposed on
out-of-state interests.
2. Protecting a Natural Resource
Alternatively, ambient air-quality levels that are better than the
federal ambient standards can be seen as a natural resource that a
downwind state might wish to protect from out-of-state encroachment
so that it can be consumed by its own citizens. From this perspective,
constraining the out-of-state deterioration of higher quality air is
analogous to constraining the out-of-state use of natural resources
such as ground water, fish, wildlife or natural gas.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, ° the Supreme Court
upheld a Nebraska statute placing restrictions on the withdrawal of
ground water from any well in Nebraska for use in an adjoining state.
The statute provided that such withdrawals would be permissible only
if they were "reasonable," "not contrary to the conservation and use
of ground water," "not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare,"
and only "if the state in which the water is to be used grants
reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground water from that
17 1
state for use in the State of Nebraska."
The Supreme Court upheld the first three restrictions but struck
down the reciprocity requirement. The Court conceded that the
restrictions that it upheld applied only to interstate transfers but
noted that in the geographic area containing the wells subject to the
litigation, the interstate restrictions "may well be no more strict in
application" than limitations imposed on intrastate transfer by the
local water district. 172 There were no findings, however, that even
in this geographic area the restrictions on interstate and intrastate
transfers were in fact equally stringent or that intrastate transfers
were governed by similar restrictions in other areas.173 The Court
openly acknowledged that preferential treatment for intrastate
transfers was appropriate. It stated: "[W ] e are reluctant to condemn
170
458 U.S. 941 (1982).
171 Id. at 944 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)).
172Id. at 956.
17 In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court struck down

an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the transportation or shipping outside the state of

natural minnows taken from in-state waters. There were no restrictions on the in-state
use of the resource, and there was a total prohibition on out-of-state use. See id. at
337-38. Thus, the disparity between in-state and out-of-state requirements was far
greater than in Sporhase.
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as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve
74
for its own citizens this vital resource in times of severe shortage."
Sporhase is even more protective of in-state interests than City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey. Both cases give the affected state full
control over the rate at which its resource is consumed. But whereas
the latter case insists on nondiscriminatory treatment for in-state and
out-of-state interests, the former allows preferential treatment for the
in-state interests.
It is important to emphasize that the ground water at issue in
Sporhasewas primarily an economic resource, to be used for agricultural activity within the state. 5 There is therefore a strong analogy
between this situation and that of a state attempting to use ambient
air-quality levels better than the federal ambient standards as a
vehicle for promoting in-state economic growth." 6 The analytically
different situation of a state attempting to preserve higher quality air
is dealt with in the following subsection.
3. Enforcing More Stringent State Ambient Standards
The final analogy is to a state seeking to impose restrictions on
the importation of products that have a detrimental impact on the
environment or on health and safety. This analogy might seem, at
first glance, to be less straightforward than the analogies that formed
the bases for the preceding two sections. After all, in the case of
interstate pollution spillovers, what the downwind state is trying to
constrain is the by-product of the industrial process under which a
product was manufactured, not the product itself.' 7
174 Sporhase, 458

U.S. at 956 (emphasis added).
I' See id. at 953. The "severe shortage" of ground water, which the Court
emphasized, id. at 956, implied that little new agricultural activity could be
undertaken, just as ambient air-quality levels close to the federal ambient standards
impede new industrial activity.
176 In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353, 363-66 (1992), the Court emphasized that its holding in Sporhase was
narrow, and that it was as a result of a "confluence of factors" that a state could
"conserve and preserve ground water for its own citizens in times of severe shortage."
For a similar view, see Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct.
1345, 1354 (1994). But even under a narrow view of Sporhase,air might be considered
a resource comparable to ground water.
'7 A different issue arises if a state attempts to restrict the importation of a
product on the ground that it was manufactured through an environmentally
undesirable process. Such practices, which have not arisen in the domestic context,
are an increasingly important issue in the regulation of international trade. See

Stewart, International supra note 3, at 1340-44.
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The interests implicated in both cases, however, are directly
analogous. The downwind state, like the importing state, seeks to
protect its citizens from undesirable environmental or health-andsafety consequences. Similarly, the federalism concerns are that the
downwind state would seek to externalize too much of the resulting
cost to the upwind state and that the importing state would do
likewise with respect to the exporting state. Thus, the standards
derived under the Dormant Commerce Clause to evaluate restrictions
on the importation of products are directly relevant to judge the
permissibility of restrictions on interstate pollution externalities.
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 78 the Supreme Court
upheld against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge 79 a Minnesota statute that banned the sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers but permitted sale in other nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers like paperboard cartons. The restriction was
designed to "promote resource conservation, ease solid waste disposal
problems, and conserve energy."180

In assessing the permissibility of the restriction under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court invoked the standard
articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.181 Under this standard,

[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser
182
impact on interstate activities.
Applying the test to the Minnesota statute, the Court found that
the restriction "regulate[d] evenhandedly" because it applied in a
nondiscriminatory fashion to both in-state and out-of-state dairies
seeking to sell milk in Minnesota. 183 With respect to the balancing
178449 U.S. 456 (1981).
"I The Court also upheld the statute against an equal protection challenge. See
id. at 461-70.
'8' Id. at 459.
181397 U.S. 137 (1970).
" Id. at 142 (citations omitted). This standard was also invoked in Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982), and City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
"ss
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981).

INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES

1996]

2407

of the local benefits against the out-of-state burdens, however,
Minnesota faced two hurdles. In brushing aside the weaknesses in
Minnesota's case, the Court set forth a reading of the Pike v. Bruce
Church balancing test that was highly deferential to the interests of
the state imposing restrictions on the importation of products.1'8
First, the Court noted that opponents of the restriction on plastic
containers "produced impressive supporting evidence at trial" to
prove that the restriction would actually exacerbate the problems
that it sought to remedy because it would induce a shift toward the
use of paperboard milk cartons, which are allegedly more harmful.' 85 On the basis of this evidence, the state trial court had
concluded, in a ruling affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
that the statute "'will not succeed in effecting the Legislature's
published policy goals.""

186

The Supreme Court, in rejecting a separate challenge to the
statute under the Equal Protection Clause, determined that the
strength of the empirical evidence adduced by the opponents was
irrelevant as long as the state legislature believed the legislative facts
on which its restriction was based. 187 Turning to the Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge, the Court found Minnesota's interest
Because the Court did not attempt an
to be "substantial."'
independent evaluation, this conclusion must have flowed directly
from deference to the legislative judgment.
Second, the restriction's challengers argued that the materials
used for making plastic nonreturnable milk jugs were produced
entirely by non-Minnesota firms, while the pulpwood used to make
paperboard was a "major Minnesota product." 8 9 This attack was
consistent with the district court's finding that the "'actual basis"' for
the statute "'was to promote the economic interests of certain
segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense
of the economic interests of other segments of the dairy industry and
the plastics industry.""9 " The Supreme Court concluded that even
if the burden on out-of-state industries was heavier, this burden was
not "'clearly excessive'" in light of Minnesota's "substantial state
18

Such deference is not unusual. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 149, at 1415;

Stewart, International,supra note 3, at 1336.
185See CloverLeaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463-64.
" Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
'8See id. at 464-65.

,IId. at 473.
189Id.

"I Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
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interest."''
Again, the Court appears to have been swayed by the
legislative decision to impose the restriction, without acknowledging
that in this context a rational legislature has a structural incentive to
privilege local interests by externalizing the costs of its statutory
92
enactments. 1
A balancing test that led to the upholding of restrictions only if
the benefits to the state imposing the restriction outweighed the costs
imposed on other states would be consistent with the goal of
maximizing social welfare' 93 and therefore consistent with the
approach of Part II. The Pike v. Bruce Church test, however, privileges
the interests of the state imposing the restriction, since it calls for
upholding restrictions unless the out-of-state costs are "clearly
excessive" when compared to the local benefits. 9 4 Moreover, the
local interests are further privileged by the manner in which the
Supreme Court applied the Pike v. Bruce Church test, deferring to the
findings of the legislature imposing the restriction.
As discussed in Part II, if the interests of upwind and downwind
states were balanced in an unbiased manner, with no thumb on the
downwind state's side of the scales, a downwind state could enjoin
upwind pollution that violated a state ambient standard more
stringent than the federal standard only if the net benefits of the
standard to the state imposing the restriction (environmental benefits
minus costs to in-state economic interests) outweighed the costs
imposed on the economic interests of other states. In contrast, the
downwind state could obtain the injunction on the basis of a lesser
showing under the Pike v. Bruce Church test, and in particular, on the
basis of the application of this test in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery.

191Id. at 473.
192 See South

Carolina State Highway Dep't v.Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2
(1938) ("[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally
upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation ...

."); Eule, supranote

151, at 445-46 (arguing that when "the cost of compliance falls upon groups to whom
the legislators are not answerable, there is no incentive to minimize the burdens or
maximize the efficiency of the regulation").
195See supraPart II.B.
1 For further discussion concerning what interests ought to be taken into account
in applying this test, see Stewart, Internationa4supra note 3, at 1336.
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4. Summary
This survey of the standards of the Dormant Commerce Clause
reveals at least four distinct approaches relevant to the analysis of the
conditions under which downwind states can obtain injunctions
against upwind pollution. 9 5 The four standards are presented in
increasing order of deference to the interests of the downwind state.
Expositionally, it is useful to consider whether injunctions against
upwind pollution would be issued under these various standards,
based on the pollution-control burdens that would result from
application of the hypothetical tax on units of environmental
degradation that was discussed above. 9 The following discussion
assumes that the emissions from the downwind state's own sources
are no higher than those that would result if they in fact had to pay
the hypothetical tax.
First, as already indicated, an unbiased application of a test that
balanced upwind against downwind interests is equivalent to the
welfare-maximization approach. Under this approach, the injunction
would be denied if the costs imposed on the upwind state were
higher than the benefits to the downwind state. Second, an
application of the Pike v. Bruce Church test that, consistent with
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, favored the downwind state's

interest would deny such an injunction only if the costs to the
upwind state were disproportionately higher than the benefits to the
downwind state. Third, an application of the nondiscrimination
provision of City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey would grant the injunc-

tion regardless of the burdens on the upwind state. Fourth, the
approach in Sporhase v. Nebraska would go even further by granting
the injunction even if the tax levied on units of environmental
degradation was higher for upwind sources than for downwind
sources.
In summary, the first of these approaches is equivalent to that of
Part II, which sought to maximize social welfare. The remaining
three approaches are increasingly more protective of the interests of
downwind states.

195This

analysis does not assume that each of these approaches is equally likely to

be adopted by the courts. Indeed, recent cases suggest that the nondiscrimination
approach is becoming dominant. See supra notes 158-61.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
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IV. THE PROMISE OF MARKETABLE-PERMIT SCHEMES
Part II identified an important structural problem raised by
procedures such as those described in sections 110(a) (2) (D) and
126(b) of the Clean Air Act, which rely on administrative and judicial
determinations of the permissible amounts of interstate externalities.
This problem arises because requiring existing sources to reduce
their emissions is generally more costly than imposing the same
standards on new sources. Thus, from the perspective of maximizing
aggregate social welfare over time, the periodic strengthening of the
emissions reductions requirements to accommodate economic growth
is likely to be more costly than "reserving" a margin for such growth
by imposing more stringent requirements at the outset. 9 7 This
problem is present both when the federal ambient standards in the
downwind state are constraining and when the downwind state has
ambient air-quality levels that are better than the federal ambient
standards.198
As noted in Part II, the problem would be far less serious if the
effects of emissions were confined to a single state, which could then,
as part of its planning process, determine where in the jurisdiction
to "reserve" the margin for growth. With interjurisdicdonal effects,
however, the situation is more complex because neither an interstate
nor a federal planning process is likely to work well to determine
how to allocate the additional burden needed to "reserve" a margin
for growth. 199
Recall, also from the discussion in Part II, that this inquiry
involves predicting where new firms will choose to locate, what the
costs of emissions reductions will be, and what impact the new firms'
emissions will have on ambient air-quality levels. When a firm
proposes to locate in a given place, these factors will determine how
the burden of ensuring compliance with the applicable federal or
state ambient standards will be allocated among that firm, other
firms in the same state, and firms in other states. The purpose of
this allocation, once again, is to maximize social welfare in light not
only of the current pattern of emissions (the static inquiry) but also
in light of future development (the dynamic inquiry).
In at least some ways, marketable-permit schemes are better
suited to address this issue than administrative or judicial inquiries.

197

See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.

198 See supra text accompanying notes 141-42, 146-48.

199See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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Most importantly, under such schemes it is not necessary for a
federal decisionmaker to determine whether the likely growth will
come to the upwind or the downwind state. Instead, either the
downwind state or the upwind state could acquire permits in the
marketplace, thereby "reserving" for itself a margin for growth.
Then, when the economic expansion materialized, the state holding
the permits could either sell them to the firms proposing to build
plants, or, as an inducement to locate in the state, simply give the
permits to those firms. 2 0 Firms planning to build plants in the
20
future could also buy permits directly in the marketplace. 1
Eventually, as with other commodities, futures markets would
develop.
The marketable permits described here would be measured in
units of environmental degradation in the downwind state, rather
than in units of emissions. Under marketable-permit schemes in
units of environmental degradation, a source must purchase permits
at each location at which its emissions will have an impact on
ambient air-quality levels. Thus, any upwind and downwind sources
that affect ambient air-quality levels at some location in the downwind state will have to purchase permits to degrade ambient air
quality at that location.
Because it is obviously impractical for a source to buy permits at
each of the infinite number of points at which such impacts occur,
some geographic aggregation is necessary for the scheme to be
administrable. Nonetheless, marketable-permit schemes measured
in units of environmental degradation, unlike marketable-permit
schemes measured in units of emissions, require that a source
purchase permits in more than one market.
Under marketable-permit schemes in units of environmental
degradation, the permissible number of emissions for each source is
a function of how the source's emissions affect ambient air-quality
levels at all of the points at which it is required to purchase permits.
For example, if eight units of emissions cause one unit of environmental degradation at a particular point away from the source, a
permit for one unit of environmental degradation at this point would
allow eight units of emissions at the source. These equivalencies
200 Under the nonattainment provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 26-31,
it is not uncommon for states to provide the offsets as an inducement to attract new
plants. SeeNATIONAL COMM'N ON AIR QUALrIY, To BREATHE CLEAN AIR 136-37 (1981).
201This discussion does not address how the initial allocation of the permits would
be conducted.
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would be predicted through mathematical modeling, and, for each
pollutant, would depend on factors such as wind patterns and
topography.
In contrast to marketable-permit schemes in units of environmental degradation, marketable-permit schemes in units of emissions
are not well suited for the task at issue here. They cannot allocatebetween upwind and downwind sources-the pollution- control
burdens that will lead to the attainment of the relevant ambient
standards in the manner that maximizes social welfare. First, if the
downwind and upwind states are in a single market for emissions
trading, any one-to-one trades would be allowed, even if such trades
compromised aggregate social welfare by transferring emissions from
a location at which their impact is less serious to a location at which
their impact is more serious. Second, marketable-permit schemes in
units of emissions cannot ensure compliance with particular ambient
standards because, if, as a result of the pattern of trades, a sufficiently large number of permits is transferred to a particular geographic
area, the applicable ambient standards will be violated at the hot
spots at which the emissions have their maximum impact.
Permits in units of environmental degradation solve this
problem." 2 The number of permits in such units is determined by
reference to the ambient standards that need to be met. Thus, hot
spots cannot occur.
Marketable-permit schemes in units of environmental degradation would minimize the cost of meeting any set of ambient
standards. Under such schemes, at the point at which no further
trades would be beneficial to the parties, for any two sources, say
Source 1 and Source 2, the following condition would hold at every
point at which the sources purchased permits: the ratio of the
marginal cost of emissions reduction for Source 1 to the marginal
cost of emissions reduction for Source 2 would equal the ratio of the
impact on ambient air quality of an additional unit of emissions from
Source 1 to the impact of an additional unit of emissions from
20 3
Source 2. Otherwise these sources would benefit from a trade.
The analysis presented here underscores an argument for the use
of marketable-permit schemes in units of environmental degradation
202For discussion of such markets, see generally W. David Montgomery, Markets in
Licenses andEfficient Pollution ControlPrograms,5J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972); Thomas
H. Tietenberg, Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air
Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis, 56 LAND ECON. 391 (1980).

203 See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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that is independent of the goal of cost minimization. Such schemes
solve a coordination problem between upwind and downwind states
that poses difficulties for other allocative mechanisms, like reliance
on administrative or judicial determinations of permissible spillovers
in light of the possibility of future economic growth. Traditionally,
the comparison between centralized regulation and marketablepermit schemes focuses on how the central planner is unlikely to
have sufficient information about matters such as the costs of
emissions reduction to devise allocations that maximize social
welfare. This problem is exacerbated here because if each state were
an independent central planner, nonmarket mechanisms for
coordinating the actions of these states would be exceedingly
cumbersome.20 4
This discussion seeks neither to design a fully specified marketable-permit scheme nor to argue that, in light of all relevant
considerations, such schemes are the preferred policy tool. Rather,
the exposition seeks to explain why marketable-permit schemes can
remedy the serious problems of coordination that otherwise would
arise.
One obvious objection to marketable-permit schemes in units of
environmental degradation is worth addressing briefly. Critics are
likely to argue that such schemes are exceedingly difficult to
administer. In particular, in order for the markets to work, one
needs accurate information about the manner in which emissions at
each source translate into ambient air-quality impacts at each
location at which these emissions affect ambient air-quality levels.
In fact, the same procedures are currently used to determine
compliance with the federal ambient standards. Indeed, the EPA
determines whether areas violate these standards primarily through
the use of computer modeling, rather than by direct measurement.20 5

These models are mathematical matrices that translate

emissions at the various sources into contributions to the degradation
of ambient air-quality levels at different distances from the sources. 21' Thus, the technical inquiry undertaken to determine compliance with the federal ambient standards under the command-and104

See supratext accompanying notes 131-32.

2 5 See, e.g., Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F2d 147, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1982) (Connecticut
I); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 910 (1978); 40 C..R. § 51.115 (1995).
206 See sources cited supra note 205. For discussion of the limitations of these

models, see supratext accompanying notes 72-74.
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control regulatory system currently in effect is identical to the one
that would need to be undertaken in order to administer a marketable-permit scheme in units of environmental degradation.
CONCLUSION

This Article has shown the extent to which the federal government has failed in the control of interstate environmental externalities. The core provisions of the environmental statutes are not well
designed for addressing this problem and may in fact have exacerbated it. The specific federal provisions dealing with interstate
externalities have been wholly ineffective in part as a result of the
inability of the EPA and the courts to analyze the problem in a
coherent manner.
Combining the conclusions of this Article with those of my earlier
work challenging race-to-the-bottom justifications for federal
environmental regulation. 7 should lead to a serious questioning of
the current structure of environmental law, with its emphasis on
regulation at the federal level. The race-to-the-bottom justification
is theoretically suspect but explains the genesis for much federal
environmental regulation. In contrast, the interstate externalities
justification is theoretically compelling but little of the regulatory
regime actually advances this goal.
This Article seeks to produce a closer congruence between the
plausible justifications for federal environmental regulation and the
structures of the particular statutes. For the short term, the
arguments presented here should lead to energizing the federal
approach to controlling interstate externalities. Even without any
statutory amendment, the EPA has the necessary statutory authority
under the Clean Air Act to adopt either the welfare-maximizing
approach developed in Part II or the Dormant Commerce Clause
approach developed in Part III.2"'
(Of course, accepting the
argument in Part III would require the EPA to adopt the Dormant
Commerce Clause standards, since these standards would represent
the default rule in the event of congressional silence.)
Indeed, the constrained interpretation of these provisions by the
EPA in the Reagan and Bush Administrations is not compelled by the
statute. Perhaps the clearest support for this view comes from the
fact that during the Carter Administration-the Administration in

207 Revesz, supra note 2.
208 The same is true for the Clean Water Act. See supra note 105.
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office at the time that the interstate externality provisions were first
enacted-the EPA took positions far more conducive to protecting
downwind states and less divergent from the standards advocated
here.219 Most importantly, upwind pollution could be enjoined
even if it did not lead to a violation of the federal ambient standards
in the downwind state. An early judicial decision also read the
relevant provisions in a manner somewhat sympathetic to the
interests of the downwind states.2 10
It was only in the early 1980s, a period during the Reagan
Administration in which environmental protection was accorded a
particularly low priority, that the current barriers to the interests of
the downwind states were first erected. Subsequently, these barriers
were solidified by a series of broad judicial opinions deferring to the
EPA.21 Moreover, in the case of upwind pollution that exacerbates
a violation of the federal ambient standards in the downwind state,
even the current approach contemplates that the permissibility of
upwind pollution should be determined by reference to a large set
of factors, including a comparison of the costs of emissions reductions and of the impacts of emissions on ambient air-quality levels of
upwind and downwind sources.
The longer-term objective of my work is to lay the foundation for
a more rational allocation of decisionmaking authority in the
environmental arena between the federal government and the states.
This Article did not question the existence of the federal ambient
standards. It asked, instead, how to constrain interstate externalities
desirably in light of these standards. A broader inquiry would ask,
simultaneously, whether ambient standards should be set at the
federal level and how interstate externalities should be constrained.
My critique of race-to-the-bottom arguments makes one step in that
direction, but the full analysis of the optimal allocation of decisionmaking authority cannot be performed without a comprehensive
evaluation of other rationales for federal environmental regulation,
including public choice arguments. 1
I plan to turn to that task
as part of my ongoing study of environmental regulation in a federal
system.

19 See supra text accompanying notes 96-98, 103 (describing the EPA's position on
interstate externalities during the Garter Administration).
210 See supra note 92 (discussing Connecticut II).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
212 See supratext accompanying notes 1-4.
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Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the issues studied here arise
in any federal system. Thus, this project should be of direct interest
to environmental policymaking in the European Union, where there
is also a mismatch between the rhetoric of interstate externalities and
the Council Directives on ambient and emissions standards that form
the core of the Union's environmental policy-a matter to which I
am turning my attention.1 8 Moreover, the standards derived here
should aid in the development of international environmental law,
with respect to both regional pollution that crosses international
boundaries, 214 and pollution that affects the global commons.

213 For discussion of issues of federalism and environmental regulation in Canada,
see Colleen Shannon, Air Pollution in Canada and the United States: Choosing to
Regulate at the Federal Level (Nov. 1995) (manuscript, on file with author).
214 Interestingly, the Dormant Commerce Clause standards of our constitutional
jurisprudence are influencing the free trade principles administered by the World
Trade Organization.
See Farber & Hudec, supra note 149, at 1419; Stewart,
International supra note 3, at 1346.

